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CRIMINAL LAW
RETROACTIVE LEGALITY: MARIJUANA
CONVICTIONS AND RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE IN AN ERA OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM
DEBORAH M. AHRENS*
The last decade has seen the beginning of a new era in United States
criminal justice policy, one characterized by a waning commitment to overcriminalization, mass incarceration, and a punitive War on Drugs as well as
a growing regret for the consequences of our prior policies. One of the
central questions raised by this shifting paradigm is what to do about the
millions of individuals punished, marked, and shunned as a result of policies
we now regret. This issue is particularly pointed for marijuana convictions,
as the coexistence of strict regimes of collateral consequences for drug
convictions and the active government promotion of a new cannabis economy
present a stark and deeply racialized contrast. This Article argues that, in
states where marijuana has been legalized, our policy-making apparatus
should acknowledge and move to redress both the failings of our prior system
of drug regulation and the social and economic disparities in current law by
embracing a concept of “retroactive legality.” Retroactive legality is a
framework in which we seek to restore those convicted of marijuana crimes
to the rights and civic status they would have had if their conduct had never
been illegal. Such an approach would build upon the piecemeal
expungement and pardon policies adopted or proposed in some of these
jurisdictions but would reach substantially further, by incorporating those
convicted of more serious offenses, putting the onus on the state to identify
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and clear such convictions, and declining to impose additional requirements
and costs on those seeking to have their convictions retroactively legalized.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 4, 2019, Washington Governor Jay Inslee, while attending
the 2019 Washington Cannabis Summit, 1 announced that he planned to offer
1

WASH. ST. CANNABIS SUMMIT, http://www.wacannabissummit.org/ [https://perma.cc/A
P5V-BCHJ]. The existence of such a (sold-out) summit is itself worth noting as a reflection
of the increasing interest in and economic power of the legal cannabis industry. The summit
featured panels on both the industry itself and political/policy objectives and advertised
participation from the Governor as well as the director of the state’s Liquor and Cannabis
Board and a policy advisor to the state Department of Agriculture. Id. There are similar annual
conventions in other states that have legalized marijuana, with similar agendas and features.
The National Cannabis Industry Association Summit, for example, was held in the spring of
2019 and included sessions on “Cannabis Business 101” and Continuing Legal Education
courses for attending lawyers. Press Release, Nat’l Cannabis Indus. Ass’n, Cannabis Business
Summit & Expo 2019 Anticipated to Attract 10,000+ Attendees, 150+ High-Profile Speakers
(May 17, 2019), www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/05/17/1826929/0/en/Cannabis
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a pardon process to about 3,500 people convicted of single minor marijuana
possession charges. 2 The juxtaposition between present and past attitudes
toward marijuana regulation was striking. The summit featured as panelists
academics, industry leaders, and government officials—people prominent
and successful in their respective, respected communities—gathered to
consider how “[t]o inspire leaders in this industry to envision a world in
which a robust cannabis industry can thoughtfully help the environment, the
economy, and social issues.” 3 Just seven years ago, a person attempting to
engage in any such industry would have be subject to criminal conviction
and substantial terms of imprisonment under Washington State law. 4 Trying
to draw connections between that past and our very different present,
Governor Inslee addressed one of the most pressing issues raised by the
legalization movement, which is the generations of individuals from the prelegalization era that remain to some extent permanently locked out of the
kind of prominence and success enjoyed by people currently engaged in
cannabis commerce.5 While Governor Inslee’s attempt to draw attention to
this issue and to begin to craft a solution is a strong first step, this Article
argues that it and other similar efforts launched in other jurisdictions are both
practically and conceptually insufficient to redress the lingering
consequences of an excessively punitive and racially discriminatory regime
that we have begun to repudiate.
Twenty years ago, the War on Drugs was in full swing; 6 it was not until
the late 1990s and early 2000s that governments began engaging in policy
shifts toward substance use that suggested that the war was not an eternal
-Business-Summit-Expo-2019-Anticipated-to-Attract-10-000-Attndees-150-High-Profile-Sp
eakers.html [https://perma.cc/E5UN-CB59]; NCBA Presents Continuing Legal Education for
Lawyers, INT’L CANNABIS BAR ASS’N, https://www.canbar.org/ncbaatncia [https://perma.cc/
J3NR-WAHJ].
2
Gene Johnson, Washington Gov. Inslee to Pardon Marijuana Convictions, AP NEWS,
Jan. 4, 2019, https://apnews.com/a57f9cd5ec4a40bcbdf7467589da617d [https://perma.cc/VX
X4-KR74].
3
WASH. ST. CANNABIS SUMMIT, supra note 1.
4
Washington State broadly legalized medical marijuana in 1998 and legalized
recreational marijuana in 2012, both times by voter initiative. See infra notes 81–87 (citing
and discussing these initiatives and related developments).
5
See Johnson, supra note 2.
6
The “War on Drugs” is, of course, the partially descriptive, partially metaphorical name
given to the United States’ concerted, punitive effort to crack down on the use of illegal drugs
between roughly 1971 and 2009. This “War” in turn drew on themes and strategies with deep
roots in American public policy. For a discussion of the War as it relates to marijuana, see
infra Part I. For this author’s take on the War more generally and on the broader history of
American drug policy, see Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Policy in an Age of
Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 846–59 (2010).
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one. 7 The fact that the governor of a state who was positioning himself for a
possible 2020 presidential run 8 would announce that he planned to use his
executive pardon power to erase the lingering effects of drug convictions was
the latest remarkable event in the 2010s, and highlights the reimagining of
the criminalization of drugs that has marked the decade.
The common wisdom for decades has been that criminal law is a “oneway ratchet,” turning only in the direction of criminalizing more conduct and
punishing existing offenses more harshly. 9 This narrative has been
problematized by a mild trend towards decarceration in the past decade,
pushed in part by a substantive desire for criminal justice reform and in part
by the reality of overburdened state budgets and declining faith in the ability
of criminal justice to combat social problems, particularly substance use. 10
7

In 2009, the Obama Administration declared an end to the War on Drugs that President
Nixon had announced in the 1970s, signaling that the administration planned to reorient
towards treatment and away from incarceration. Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End
to ‘War on Drugs,’ WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124225891
527617397 [https://perma.cc/RLZ8-HQBR]. The Trump Administration has sent more
conflicting signals. On the one hand, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, during his tenure,
seemed intent on reinvigorating the use of criminal prosecution to combat a perceived drug
scourge. See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, How Jeff Sessions Wants to Bring Back the War on Drugs,
WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-je
ff-sessions-/2017/04/08/414ce6be-132b-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.2
b8484a1e259 [https://perma.cc/42UY-5JQC]. To the extent that the Administration has tried
to roll back legalization efforts, it has encountered a bipartisan Congressional barrier, as
legislators have highlighted the disconnect between a Republican states’ rights platform and
efforts to crack down on legal marijuana use and pointed out that candidate Donald Trump
had campaigned on a platform that left marijuana laws to states. See Matt Laslo, Pot
Showdown: How Congress Is Uniting to Stop Jeff Sessions’ War on Drugs, ROLLING STONE,
Jan. 19, 2018, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/pot-showdown-howcongress-is-uniting-to-stop-jeff-sessions-war-on-drugs-203859/ [https://perma.cc/37XN-ZX4
9]. As detailed infra note 128, the Administration recently signed the First Step Act, which
rolls back some drug war excesses.
8
See, e.g., Jim Brunner, Jay Inslee for President? Governor’s Profile is on the Rise,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2017, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/insleesprofile-lifted-with-states-legal-victories-on-immigration/
[https://perma.cc/3DL7-UMJQ]
(early article explaining presidential ambitions of Governor Inslee and making case for its
plausibility).
9
See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 223
(2007); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
509 (2001).
10
The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that as of the end of 2016, the total corrections
population (persons incarcerated in prisons and jails) had dropped for the eighth year in a row;
from 2007 to 2016, the proportion of incarcerated Americans dropped from 3,210 to 2,640 in
100,000 adults. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 1 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/cont
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The traditional narrative was further undermined by the trend toward
decriminalizing and/or legalizing the use of marijuana for medical and
recreational purposes. Marijuana, once characterized at best as a gateway
drug to harder substances, 11 and at worst a drug that transformed users into
violent criminals, 12 is in several states now legalized and available in
suburban strip malls and hipster downtown pot shops, complete with twee
signage and tasting bars. 13 Some additional jurisdictions that continue to
formally criminalize marijuana possession have effectively decriminalized
its use through no-prosecution policies. 14 Marijuana has gone mainstream,
viewed in many states as a reasonable recreational option and an engine of
potential economic growth. 15
This social and legal transformation has, however, left people behind.
Even as the pace of legalization quickens, people remain incarcerated for
marijuana offenses within jurisdictions that have legalized recreational
marijuana. 16 Other people are still on probation or parole for marijuana

ent/pub/pdf/cpus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9QA-XVXR]. While the number of incarcerated
Americans peaked at 2,310,300 in 2008, by the end of 2016, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimates that 2,162,400 people were incarcerated. See id. at 1–2. This decline did not reflect
that people who formerly might have been incarcerated were all simply shunted to various
forms of correction supervision, such as parole and probation (although even such a shift
would be notable); the population of persons under correctional supervision also declined
during this period, from a high of 5,119,000 in 2007 to 4,650,900 in 2016 (the number of
persons on parole did increase, suggesting that at least some of the decline in incarceration
may attributable to increased use of parole; jurisdictions may simply be placing fewer newlyconvicted persons under various forms of correctional control). Id.
11
See, e.g., McKenzie M. Higgins, Total Inclusion: Opening Therapeutic Justice Courts
to Medical Marihuana Patients in Michigan, 17 W. MICH. U. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L.
125, 142 (2016) (describing as typical the characterization of marijuana as a gateway drug);
Robert L. DuPont, Marijuana Has Proven to Be a Gateway Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/26/is-marijuana-a-gateway-drug/marijuan
a-has-proven-to-be-a-gateway-drug [https://perma.cc/Z8TQ-Z3XH] (President of the Institute
for Behavior and Health arguing that marijuana is a gateway drug for cocaine,
methamphetamine, and heroin).
12
See infra note 45 (discussing early efforts to demonize marijuana users).
13
Barney’s now cultivates “The High End,” a luxury marijuana accoutrement department.
Amanda Mull, Legal Weed Gets a Luxury Makeover, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 14, 2019, https://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/02/barneys-launches-new-cannabis-department/58
2772/ [https://perma.cc/KX3S-CMFR].
14
See infra notes 70–76.
15
For a discussion of some of the ways in which marijuana has been integrated into the
commercial and communal life of the jurisdictions who have legalized its use and sale,
including some genuinely amusing examples, see infra notes 110–117 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 53–56 (discussing prosecution and incarceration of marijuana users,
sellers, and growers during the War on Drugs).
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offenses that preceded legalization. 17 Many more people have criminal
records that reflect marijuana offenses, and those criminal histories impede
the ability of convicted persons to enjoy full participation in civic life. 18
The extent to which criminal convictions constrain people’s lives has
been documented thoroughly. 19 The direct consequences of criminal
convictions—generally, fines, incarceration, and community supervision—
are included in the governing criminal statutes. 20 Additional civil laws
impose formal legal consequences for criminal convictions, including voter
disenfranchisement, disqualification from jury service, and exclusion from
some public benefits. 21 Less formally, persons convicted of crimes also face
consequences in employment, private housing, professional licensing, and
social interactions. 22 These consequences have existed to varying degrees
for some time, but they have intensified in an era where information is readily
available on the internet and employment, housing, and other life
requirements require identification processes that often include background
checks. 23 A criminal conviction marks a person fundamentally and
indelibly. 24
Such a mark is unfair when the essence of the underlying conduct is
now viewed as acceptable. Marijuana sales and purchases in several states
enjoy governing laws that affirmatively support such activity; legislatures
generally crafted these laws in response to public referenda or propositions
that supported legalization and reflected that citizens believed the behavior
should no longer be prosecuted. 25 There is a disconnect between the
17

See id.
See infra notes 53–56.
19
See infra notes 180–198 (discussing the collateral consequences of criminal
convictions). For one among many outstanding scholarly discussions of these issues, see
Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010).
20
Virtually every criminal statute includes a description of direct punishments available.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.101 et seq. (West 2019) (providing up to five years
of incarceration and/or a $10,000 fine for possession of cocaine and offering that a person may
qualify for probation in lieu of incarceration).
21
See, e.g., Pinard, supra note 19; see also infra Part III.C (documenting and discussing
collateral consequences imposed on those convicted of crimes).
22
See infra notes 190–199 and sources cited therein.
23
For this author’s take on that history, see Deborah Ahrens, Note, Not in Front of the
Children: Prohibition on Child Custody as Civil Branding for Criminal Activity, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 737, 742–50 (2000).
24
See id. at 738–40 (drawing on literature to explain how marking and branding of
offenders as “other” is a core objective of most formal and informal collateral consequence
regimes).
25
See infra notes 85–89.
18
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formalization of and favor for the legal cannabis industry and the ongoing
consequences faced by persons previously convicted. That disconnect is
particularly troubling when the communities harmed by the past excesses of
the War on Drugs are not the same communities enjoying the benefit of
legalization. 26 The continuing constraints lack justification and fail to honor
many of the reasons why the legalization movement has succeeded. As this
Article explains, the movement to legalize marijuana is grounded not only in
forward-thinking interest in raising revenue and reducing government
spending but also in retrospective regret over the racial disparities that
resulted from and perhaps fueled the War on Drugs, as well as the broader
cultural violence wrought by mass incarceration. 27
This Article argues that the particular confluence of these factors—
particularly the disparities in demographics and fortunes between people
prosecuted in the past under criminal law and people currently cashing in on
legal cannabis—suggests a paradigm shift in how we should deal with
existing marijuana convictions, one grounded in the principle of retroactive
legalization. On a conceptual level, our goal ought to be to restore to full
civic equality (and full entrepreneurial opportunity) all those prosecuted in
the past for activity that would be legal in the present. In addition, we ought
to do so through mechanisms that put the onus for implementation on the
state, as the collective representative of the forces that imposed an
unjustifiable and imbalanced coercive regime, rather than on the individual
already operating under the weight of these cumulative sanctions and
disadvantages.
Under this paradigm, all marijuana convictions in jurisdictions that have
legalized marijuana should be effectively expunged and sealed. Some
jurisdictions have already started doing this to a limited extent for
misdemeanor marijuana convictions—prosecutors voluntarily are clearing
records and expunging convictions where the convictions are minor and
where convicted persons meet other eligibility criteria.28 Jurisdictions vary
in whether they require the person convicted of an offense to come forward
or whether they are willing to do the work to identify and expunge
convictions, regardless of whether or not the person convicted is aware that
26
See Shane Croucher, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez: Marijuana Prohibition Hit Black and
Latino People Hardest So They Should Profit from Legalization First, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14,
2019, https://www.newsweek.com/aoc-marijuana-cannabis-profit-war-drugs-1331214 [https:
//perma.cc/38UU-Z9BD] (describing a congressional hearing where one representative made
this point forcefully).
27
For a discussion of some of the reasons fueling this policy change, see infra notes 134–
158 and accompanying text.
28
For a general discussion of these efforts, see infra notes 93–105 and accompanying text.
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the conviction is eligible for erasure. 29 This Article argues, first, that all
jurisdictions where marijuana has been legalized should expunge prior
misdemeanor convictions and should do so through automatic mechanisms
that do not rely on the individuals convicted of these offenses to come
forward, make motions, meet additional criteria, or pay fees for the privilege
of regaining their civic equality. 30
In addition, this Article suggests that universalizing the clearance of
misdemeanors is insufficient. True retroactive legalization requires
jurisdictions that have fully legalized the marijuana industry to treat felony
marijuana convictions—convictions that may be for distribution, possession
with intent to distribute, or trafficking—in the same manner. 31 Mass
expungement for felony convictions is likely to be met with more resistance
than forgiving misdemeanor possession convictions, 32 but according to the
analysis presented here, the broad embrace of the cannabis industry as an
engine of economic development and the construction of a regime of laws
and government institutions supporting that industry requires such a step. In
some ways, this proposal does not go nearly far enough—there is a large
body of people who would not have been convicted of other offenses or
would not have been sentenced as seriously as they were for other offenses

29
For a discussion of the diversity of approaches employed, see infra notes 93–105 and
accompanying text.
30
Even some of the better designed programs, like Denver’s “Turn Over a New Leaf”
Program, impose significant obligations on those carrying convictions, including meetings
with prosecutors that impose psychic costs and potentially expose those individuals to
additional scrutiny and legal jeopardy. See Bobbi Sheldon, You Can Apply to Have Marijuana
Convictions Expunged Under New Denver Program, 9NEWS, Jan. 9, 2019, https://www.9new
s.com/article/news/local/you-can-apply-to-have-marijuana-convictions-expunged-under-new
-denver-program/73-613378e0-0a68-4e64-a2a3-dda0bb04b297 [https://perma.cc/LJ8Q-9CN
H].
31
While the majority of states that have legalized marijuana for recreational use have also
enacted legislation to regulate a legal production and distribution industry in-state, two
jurisdictions—Vermont and the District of Columbia—have only legalized personal
marijuana possession. See infra note 107. In states that do not yet permit legal marijuana
businesses, there is not the same imperative to ensure that persons convicted of offenses
involving marijuana sales and cultivation enjoy the benefit of having those past convictions
cleared.
This Article leaves for another day the question whether it is theoretically appropriate and
practically possible to extend the principle of retroactive legality to situations in which an
individual came under police suspicion for conduct that is now legal (such as smoking
marijuana) but was ultimately convicted of an unrelated crime. For an argument that, whatever
lines we choose, retroactive legalization will inevitably be both over- and under-inclusive, see
infra Part V.
32
See infra Part V (discussing reasons that might be put forward to oppose some or all
expungements).
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if they did not have marijuana convictions, 33 and we might productively
debate whether some or all of those people are due some relief from the lifelong consequences of their convictions. But eliminating both misdemeanor
and felony convictions for marijuana offenses is a concrete first step towards
a form of restorative justice 34 for the War on Drugs.
In the long term, criminal justice reform—the response to decades of
mass incarceration that has positioned the United States as the world’s
foremost incarcerator—is going to need to involve structural changes in
criminal processes as well as substantive changes in criminal law. 35
Academics and activists alike have noted the tendency to treat all social
problems as criminal justice problems and to address issues like mental
health, homelessness, and substance use disorders through convictions and
sentencing, rather than through less expensive civil and community processes
that leave less of a permanent mark on individuals and better meet their
needs. 36 As we hopefully head into an era of transformation, it will be
important to think through how to address existing generations of people who
already have experienced prosecution and punishment for offenses we have
concluded ought not to have been approached through a criminal justice lens.
While each area of over-criminalization raises unique issues of redress and
restorative justice, this Article is hopeful that we can address marijuana
33
Under the sentencing systems in place under federal law and in every state, criminal
histories play a significant role, either formally or informally, in determining sentences. This
process is particularly formalized under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which calculate a
“criminal history score” that is one of the two major determinants of the recommended
sentence. For a chart that demonstrates just how regimented the calculation can be, see the
training materials, prepared in 1991, that are used by the Arkansas Public Defender
Organization. Calculating Criminal History: An Outline, UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/annual-national-training-s
eminar/2011/004c_Calc_Criminal_History_Outline.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6ZN-ZWHA].
34
”Restorative justice” may be a somewhat awkward title for changes that do not, as
restorative justice generally suggests, bring together a victim and defendant for a form of
community-based negotiated resolution, but, rather, offer limited redress to persons convicted
of criminal offenses once communities determine that the mark of criminal conviction no
longer is appropriate. Nevertheless, restorative justice—a model focused more on a healing
process that includes a person who has committed an offense, rather than centering on
retribution—is philosophically closer to what this Article advocates.
35
For one well-reviewed look at the opportunities presented by the current criminal justice
moment, see RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS
INCARCERATION (2019).
36
See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 3 (2007)
(“Americans have built a new civil and political order structured around the problem of violent
crime.”); Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1669, 1697, 1701 (2012) (explaining how the use of criminal law and policing
strategies warps the ways in which our public schools handle issues of “bullying”).

388

AHRENS

[Vol. 110

convictions in a broad and reflective way that will provide a template for
future reforms.
Part I describes the history of marijuana regulation in this country,
focusing first on the system of harsh criminalization that developed during
the twentieth century and then on the rapidly escalating movement for
legalization that has picked up steam in the early twenty-first century. Part
II discusses and analyzes the reasons for and consequences of the
contemporary legalization movement. Part III builds a case for a broad
policy of retroactive legality, drawing on the various factors laid out above.
Part IV addresses the mechanics of retroactive legalization, balancing the
pros and cons of mass pardons and broad expungement policies. Finally,
Part V addresses and answers some of the objections that might be raised to
this Article’s bold policy proposal.
I. MARIJUANA REGULATIONS: THEN AND NOW
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARIJUANA (AND NARCOTICS) LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES

Throughout most of this country’s history, marijuana cultivation, sale,
and use was untouched by criminal law. 37 The United States did not begin
the process of addressing illicit substance use and sales with law until 1914,
and, even then, early substance regulation was largely civil in nature and
focused on importation and sales rather than on individual use. 38 That early
civil history of substance legislation was marked by racism and nativism—
the laws enacted tended to reflect the concern dominant cultural groups had
about the deleterious effects of immigrants, minorities, and, particularly,
immigrant minorities; thus, these laws sought to regulate drugs thought to be
connected with those communities. 39 Initial efforts at regulation were
37

See, e.g., DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
1–2 (3d ed. 1999) (describing the popularity of recreational and medical opium use during the
nineteenth century).
38
Congress adopted the Harrison Narcotics Act (“the Act”) in 1914. The Act created
requirements for narcotics producers and distributors to complete registration requirements,
pay taxes, and track sales; unregistered persons were only permitted to purchase narcotics by
prescription, although there was no criminal penalty for violation of the Act. See Harrison
Narcotics Act, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). Even civil enforcement was lax. See
MUSTO, supra note 37, at 9.
39
For my fuller take on these themes, see Ahrens, supra note 6, at 847. For other research
that supports this narrative, see generally TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY:
LAW, DRUGS, AND MORAL JUDGEMENT (1970); JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE:
STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963); MUSTO, supra note
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spurred in large part by the association of opioid use with immigrants from
China. 40 Opioids supposedly caused the immigrants to become lazy and
violent, and in the popular imagination, they lured white women into opium
dens to provide them with narcotics and sedate them for other immoral
purposes. 41
While narcotics regulation in the very early twentieth century was
entirely civil, by the early 1930s the majority of states attached criminal
penalties to narcotics, including cocaine in particular. 42 This move was
fueled in large part by narratives about cocaine-using black Americans who
would develop superhuman strength and commit sexual assaults against
white women. 43 Legislation specific to marijuana followed a similar pattern:
as marijuana became linked with a disfavored social group, criminal
sanctions followed. In the 1920s and 30s, marijuana became heavily
associated with immigrants from Mexico; 44 politicians portrayed these
immigrants as enjoying superhuman powers while under the influence of the
drug and linked violent criminality and sexual licentiousness with
marijuana. 45 State legislatures began to class marijuana with narcotics and

37. For a representative work skeptical of the thesis that drug policy generally has centered
around attacking unpopular groups, see JAMES B. BAKALAR & LESTER GRINSPOON, DRUG
CONTROL IN A FREE SOCIETY 68–72 (1984) (arguing that while drug policy does reflect things
like attitudes towards minorities, drugs also have specific health effects that may prompt
restriction).
40
See LESTER GRINSPOON & PETER HEDBLOM, THE SPEED CULTURE: AMPHETAMINE USE
AND ABUSE IN AMERICA 185 (1975) (arguing that public attitudes towards opium shifted from
sympathetic association with wounded, morphine-addicted Civil War veterans to
unsympathetic association with Chinese laborers); MUSTO, supra note 37, at 5.
41
See GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 40, at 185 (arguing that public attitudes
towards opium shifted from sympathetic association with wounded, morphine-addicted Civil
War veterans to unsympathetic association with Chinese laborers); MUSTO, supra note 37, at
5.
42
See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 14–21 (noting that, by 1931, thirty-six
states made unauthorized possession of cocaine a crime).
43
See id. at 38–39. While black Americans likely used cocaine at a rate lower than white
Americans in this historical period, see id. at 39, black Americans became associated with
cocaine in cultural imagination, see MUSTO, supra note 37, at 43–44.
44
See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION:
A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES (1974). Marijuana
criminalization largely dovetailed with the increase in immigration from Mexico from 1915
to 1930. See id. at 13. For a general discussion of the association of marijuana use with
Mexican immigrants, see H. WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800–
1980 93–94 (1981).
45
See MORGAN, supra note 44, at 38. For example, in the Montana legislature, the
association of marijuana with “Mexican beet field workers” was at the center of the argument
for criminalization. Id. at 39–40.
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subject it to criminal penalties during this period. 46 In 1937, the federal
government passed the Marihuana Tax Act, which for all practical purposes
Anti-marijuana laws,
made marijuana illegal under federal law.47
interestingly, were not rooted in public outcry or demand. They appear to
have been pushed largely by narrow private interests and individual political
representatives. 48
In the 1970s, marijuana became linked with black communities as well
as youthful cultural dissenters, leading to a new stream of condemnation and
new efforts to crack down on its use. 49 As part of a political strategy to
mobilize “the silent majority” against other segments of society, President
Richard Nixon actively sought to tie drug use broadly, and marijuana use
specifically, to those communities—neither of which was at the core of
Republican support and both of which Nixon characterized as enemies. 50
The War on Drugs was both a popular metaphor and a mechanism for directly
regulating those communities. 51
By the 1980s and early 1990s, illicit substance criminalization had
reached a fever pitch. The era did not focus primarily on marijuana—
marijuana did not enjoy the publicity or concern, for example, showered on
crack cocaine use—but marijuana offenses were almost always included
when legislatures increased maximum penalties for drug offenses, 52

46

See generally BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 44 (detailing this history).
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551. The Marihuana Tax Act
imposed strict rules requiring an expensive tax stamp for every sale of marijuana, but these
stamps were almost never issued by the federal government.
48
See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 44, at 49.
49
See Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Punitive Prohibition in America, in CRACK
IN AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 321 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine
eds., 1997) (arguing that marijuana became part of a proxy political war across cultures and
generations).
50
A Nixon aide has said that his antipathy towards marijuana was motivated by race. Dan
Baum, Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S, Apr. 2016, https://har
pers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/ [https://perma.cc/4X33-Z3FF] (According to John
Ehrlichman, “We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the [Vietnam] war or
black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin,
and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest
their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on
the evening news.”).
51
Id.
52
See John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National
Purse, The Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 565–79
(1991).
47
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introduced mandatory minimum sentences, 53 included drug offenses in some
three-strike and two-strike sentencing schemes, 54 and approved sentencing
guidelines that increased penalties for drug offenses and required sentencing
based on overall drug distribution quantities (including un-convicted and
acquitted conduct). 55 These changes were not prompted by an increase in
drug abuse or sales—by the time legislatures had changed their laws,
substance use rates were in decline. 56 Rather, changes in laws dovetailed
with racialized panic about drug use. 57
B. A RACIALLY DISPARATE REGIME

The history of drug law broadly, and marijuana law specifically, is thus
one that has been shaped by race and by a desire to characterize persons
associated with illicit substances as “other.” 58 It is thus not particularly
surprising that racial minorities are more likely to be convicted of drug
offenses. These disparities are not unique to drug offenses, and there is a rich
empirical literature documenting differing outcomes by race at every
discretionary stage of criminal prosecution, from temporary detention and

53

See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (1988), http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/uscode/uscode
1988-00802/uscode1988-008021013/uscode1988-008021013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CMHMFDD] (imposing mandatory five-year minimum period of imprisonment for possession of 5
grams of crack-cocaine).
54
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988), http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/uscode/uscode
1988-00802/uscode1988-008021013/uscode1988-008021013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CMHMFDD] (imposing mandatory term of life imprisonment for any person violating
§ 841(b)(1)(A), 845, 845(a), or 845(b) after two or more previous convictions).
55
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988), http://cdn.loc.gov/service/ll/uscode/uscode198801202/uscode1988-012028058/uscode1988-012028058.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7UR-LP5V]
(detailing the purpose of the then newly congressionally created United States Sentencing
Commission); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 102D CONG., SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23
(1991), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/137910NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/W
N6G-FDC4] (explaining that “the total quantity of drugs distributed should influence the
sentence,” and not the defendant’s degree of responsibility).
56
See Ahrens, supra note 6, at 852–59 (detailing dynamics of and lack of policy basis for
this round of drug crackdowns).
57
See Powell & Hershenov, supra note 52, at 559–64, 568.
58
See infra Part I.A.
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investigation, 59 to arrest, to pretrial detention, to conviction, to sentencing. 60
Those disparities are particularly striking in the context of drug offenses,
however, because rates of drug use tend to be constant by race, but arrest and
conviction rates diverge dramatically. 61 Part of the reason for this disparity
may be that while violent and property offenses generally have identified
victims who must in some way be addressed or accommodated, drug offenses
generally do not; decisions about who to arrest and how to prosecute
therefore reflect decisions about patrolling and investigating more than they
do actual underlying offense rates. 62
The figures for marijuana arrests are particularly stark. While black and
white Americans use marijuana at about the same rate, black Americans are
3.73 times more likely to be arrested for marijuana offenses. 63 Even in states
that now have legalized marijuana, arrests for people whose behavior
remains regulated by criminal statute—unlicensed sellers and underage
users—remains racially disproportionate, and white residents in some states
have benefited disproportionately from legalization because they have
dominated cannabis commerce. 64
59
Latinx and black suspects detained by police during traffic stops and on-foot encounters
are more likely to be searched than white suspects. See Robin Shepard Engel & Jennifer M.
Calnon, Examining the Influence of Drivers’ Characteristics During Traffic Stops with Police:
Results from a National Survey, 21 JUST. Q. 49, 49–90 (2004); Patricia Warren et al., Driving
While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity in Police Stops, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 709, 709–
38 (2006).
60
Members of racial minority groups are more likely to experience pretrial detention—
empirical studies suggest that they are more likely to receive bond; that bond amounts may be
higher; that bond conditions may be more stringent; and that they will spend longer in pretrial
detention where they cannot make bond. See, e.g., Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic
Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 170, 170–92 (2005).
61
See, e.g., Maia Szlavitz, Study: Whites More Likely to Abuse Drugs than Blacks, TIME
MAG., Nov. 7, 2011, http://healthland.time.com/2011/11/07/study-whites-more-likely-to-abu
se-drugs-than-blacks/ [https://perma.cc/45HW-X2S2].
62
See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055,
1076 (2015); Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic
Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 686–89 (2015).
63
See AM. CIV. LIB. UNION, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE (2013). Arrest
rates and conviction rates clearly are not the same thing—many arrests never end in
conviction, and arrests may be effectuated for reasons other than an intention to secure a
criminal conviction. See Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 331 (2016)
(noting that arrests may be effected as a formal commencement to criminal proceedings, but
also as a means of disrupting ongoing criminal activity).
64
The Drug Policy Alliance (a pro-drug-legalization group) has documented that although
arrests have declined for all races in states that have legalized marijuana, racial disparities in
arrest rates hold firm. See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, FROM PROHIBITION TO PROGRESS: A
STATUS REPORT ON MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION 5 (2018), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/def
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C. THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION

Twenty-three years ago, marijuana was formally illicit for all purposes
in all states and under federal law; as this section outlines, the legal landscape
for marijuana has changed rapidly and reflects broader trends in criminal law
reform. A minority of states have legalized recreational marijuana, but it is
likely, given high public support for legalization, that more jurisdictions will
follow soon. 65 The formal transformation of marijuana from the subject of
harsh criminal penalties to a legitimate legal enterprise is relatively recent—
the first states to legalize marijuana for general recreational use did not do so
until 2012. 66 For decades prior to that, however, many states were reducing,
transforming, or eliminating criminal convictions for low-level marijuana
possession offenses, either as a matter of state law or as an issue of locallyexercised prosecutorial discretion. 67 Legalization of recreational marijuana
followed on the heels of medical marijuana legalization, which commenced
about fifteen years prior and provided legal marijuana access to a restricted
population. 68 This section describes that path of marijuana legalization.
In the years prior to formal legalization of recreational marijuana, a
number of jurisdictions had either effectively legalized personal marijuana
use or had essentially converted simple possession of marijuana into a civil
offense. Oregon was the first state to do so, decriminalizing possession of
small amounts of marijuana in 1973, and other jurisdictions have pursued
similar half-way policies in the decades since. 69 For example, some
ault/files/dpa_marijuana_legalization_report_feb14_2018_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Z45-XD
C2] (documenting dramatic declines in marijuana arrest rates in states that have legalized).
The Colorado Department of Public Safety reported on post-legalization trends in the state
and showed that the rate of arrest for white residents under the new legalization regime had
declined at a faster rate than that for black residents. See COLORADO DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION IN COLORADO: EARLY FINDINGS 5 (2016), http://cdpsdocs.state.
co.us/ors/docs/reports/2016-SB13-283-Rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER8U-UDSN] (noting that
the arrest rates for marijuana offenses declined 51% for white residents since legalization, but
declined 33% for people the state classifies as Hispanic and 25% for black residents).
65
In answer to the question, “do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal, or
not?” in 1969, 84% of Americans responded that it should be illegal, while 12% favored
legalization. See Andrew Daniller, Two-Thirds of Americans Support Marijuana Legalization,
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 14, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/08/a
mericans-support-marijuana-legalization/ [https://perma.cc/2HN8-UDGV]. Around 2010,
support for marijuana legalization became the majority position; by 2018, it had reached 62%.
See id. Younger respondents favor legalization more than older respondents, and Democrats
and independents favor legalization more than Republicans, but even Republican voters are
almost evenly split. Id.
66
See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
67
See infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
68
See infra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
69
See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864(3) (2015) (repealed 2017 by 2017 Or. Laws c. 21 § 126).
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jurisdictions have pursued no-arrest or no-prosecution policies for personaluse marijuana possession. 70 Others have permitted some form of
prosecution, but by policy disposed of simple possession of marijuana
charges by making them fine-only offenses. 71 Jurisdictions did so for a
variety of reasons: resource constraints, 72 diminishing public support for
criminalization, 73 acknowledgement of social disparities, 74 and genuine
conviction that low-level marijuana offenses were not worthy of real criminal

70
A district attorney’s office might de facto decriminalize marijuana under the
stewardship of its particular elected lead prosecutor, for example, but that policy would be
subject to change by a new lead prosecutor. Such policies remain a popular tactic today. See,
e.g., Tim Prudente, Baltimore Will Stop Prosecuting Marijuana Possession, Mosby
Announces, BALT. SUN, Jan. 30, 2019, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/b
s-md-mosby-marijuana-prosecution-policy-20190129-story.html [https://perma.cc/7WXA-2
KEW].
71
Oregon began the decriminalization process in 1973 by reducing the penalty for
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana to a $100 fine. See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864(3)
(1973) (repealed 2017 by 2017 Or. Laws c. 21 § 126). Other jurisdictions similarly have
converted low-level marijuana offenses into violation-level fine-only offenses. See, e.g.,
Henry Glass, Meet a New Breed of Prosecutor, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 17, 2017,
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/0717/Meet-a-new-breed-of-prosecutor [https:
//perma.cc/S8ND-WHCN] (new District Attorney in Nueces County, Texas instituted policy
whereby misdemeanor marijuana offenses would be disposed of via a $250 fine and a drug
class).
72
See, e.g., Brian X. McCrone, Marijuana Criminal Cases Dropped En Masse by
Philadelphia District Attorney, NBC PHILA. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcphiladelphia.c
om/news/local/Marijuana-Criminal-Cases-Dropped-En-Masse-by-Philadelphia-District-Atto
rney-Larry-Krasner-474228023.html [https://perma.cc/SK23-2FKK]; Brian Rogers, Local,
State Officials Clash Over District Attorney’s Marijuana Policy, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 22,
2017, https://www.pressreader.com/usa/houston-chronicle/20170217/281479276174559 [htt
ps://perma.cc/7R93-2DC5].
73
See, e.g., Tony Rizzo & Glenn E. Rice, Jackson County Prosecutor Stops Charging
Marijuana Possession Cases, With Exceptions, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 16, 2018, https://
www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article221595600.html [https://perma.cc/5CK6-W5D
3] (lead prosecutor in Jackson County noted that juries have changed their attitudes toward
marijuana offenses).
74
See, e.g., Julie Fine, Cruezot Offers Insight into How He Will Run Dallas County
District Attorney’s Office, NBC FORT WORTH (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/
local/dallas-county-da-swears-in-prosecutors-and-investigators/9641/ [https://perma.cc/4WL
R-YTM9] (new District Attorney noted that most people prosecuted for first-time marijuana
offenses are poor).
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treatment. 75 De facto decriminalization of marijuana is not legalization, 76
and no jurisdiction applied the same standards to felony marijuana offenses,
but the current marijuana legalization movement was preceded by “soft”
decriminalization for some time (an approach not seen with other drugs such
as cocaine or heroin). In many jurisdictions where formal legalization efforts
have stalled, prosecutors and legislators continue to pursue either de facto 77
or, in some cases, formal decriminalization.78
Early efforts to formally legalize marijuana focused largely on
permitting people with various ailments to obtain marijuana via prescription,
and in jurisdictions that have legalized recreational marijuana use, medical
marijuana legalization generally came first. 79 California became the first
state to do so; voters approved the legalization of marijuana for medical use
via Proposition 215 in 1996. 80 Alaska, Oregon, and Washington quickly
75

See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prosecutor Limits When
He’ll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/ny
region/brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-level-marijuana-cases.html [https:/
/perma.cc/P97E-8V3E] (Brooklyn DA limited marijuana prosecutions because of the
problems convictions create with “jobs, housing and school for defendants”); Rebecca
Rosenburg, Manhattan DA’s New Marijuana Policy Set to go into Effect, N.Y. POST, July 31,
2018, https://nypost.com/2018/07/31/manhattan-das-new-marijuana-policy-set-to-go-into-eff
ect/ [https://perma.cc/J7MZ-J7TU] (Manhattan DA’s new non-prosecution policy based on
finding “virtually no public safety rationale . . . and no moral justification for the intolerable
racial disparities”).
76
“Decriminalization” in the form of fine-only prosecution still leaves a person with a
criminal record, although the person will not face a threat of incarceration or community
supervision, and will not have a felony record (or, where decriminalization has converted
simple possession into a violation-level offense, a misdemeanor record).
77
See generally notes 72–76 (detailing some such efforts).
78
See, e.g., John Hageman, Marijuana Decriminalization Bill in the Works after ND
Legalization Effort Fails, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Nov. 23, 2018, https://www.grandforksher
ald.com/news/government-and-politics/4532869-marijuana-decriminalization-bill-works-aft
er-nd-legalization [https://perma.cc/9Y95-2QQ3].
79
The Food and Drug Administration has not tested marijuana for safety as generally
required for prescription drugs. See Researching the Potential Medical Benefits and Risks of
Marijuana: Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Terrorism, 114th Cong. (2016), https://www.
fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm511057.htm [https://perma.cc/VA9F-FM5F] (statement of
Douglas Throckmorton, Deputy Director for Regulatory Programs, Center for Drug
Evaluation & Research, Food & Drug Administration).
80
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West. Supp. 2020). Proposition 215—
the Medical Use of Marijuana Initiative or the Compassionate Use Act—was preceded by
legislation that similarly would have legalized medical marijuana in California; that legislation
was vetoed twice by then-governor Pete Wilson. See Dennis Romero, Dueling Initiatives
Cloud Legalization Bid, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-12-11/
news/ls-12856_1_medical-marijuana [https://perma.cc/EE6B-TUHE]. California voters
approved the initiative by about 55.58%. See Votes For and Against November 5, 1996,
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followed in 1998, approving medical marijuana use via statewide popular
ballot processes. 81 States have steadily legalized marijuana for medical
purposes since. To date, thirty-three states have legalized medical marijuana
use; support for medical marijuana became so widespread that Utah—a state
generally noted for religion-based substance prohibition—legalized medical
marijuana in the last election cycle.82 While initial efforts at medical
marijuana legalization generally involved ballot initiatives, many states are
now legalizing medical marijuana through state legislative processes.83
In 2012, Colorado 84 and Washington 85 became the first states to legalize
recreational marijuana. In both states, as was the case with early medical
marijuana reforms, the law changed through ballot initiative rather than
through the state legislative process. 86 Legalization in each state combined
the redrafting of criminal law to permit the legal possession, cultivation, and
Statewide Ballot Measures and Constitutional Amendments, California Secretary of State,
https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/1996-general/votes-for-against.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U
KD-2UPV].
81
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. 17 § 1, 17.35.010–17.35.080 (West. 2020); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 475B.785 (West 2020); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. 69.51A (West 2020). Voters in
Alaska approved Ballot Measure 8, an indirect state statute to legalize medical marijuana use,
by 58%. See Alaska Medical Marijuana Act, Measure 8 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotp
edia.org/Alaska_Medical_Marijuana_Act,_Measure_8_(1998) [https://perma.cc/VJN7-TD8
9]. Oregon voters approved Oregon Ballot Measure 67, The Oregon Medical Marijuana Act,
by about 54.7%. See Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, Measure 67 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Medical_Marijuana,_Measure_67_(1998) [https://perma.cc/5
6NP-9JAD]. Voters in Washington approved Initiative 692, The Washington Medical
Marijuana Initiative, by about 59%. See Washington Medical Marijuana, Initiative 692 (1998),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Medical_Marijuana,_Initiative_692_ (199
8) [https://perma.cc/7HJE-HQXF].
82
As discussed below, infra notes 84–89, Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and the District of
Columbia have all legalized recreational marijuana use, and those states in addition permit the
medical use of marijuana. An additional twenty-three states have legalized medical marijuana
but not recreational marijuana: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah,
and West Virginia.
83
Medical cannabis was approved by ballot measure (in chronological order) in twelve
states: California, Oregon, Alaska, Washington, Maine, Nevada, Colorado, Montana,
Michigan, Arizona, Missouri, and Utah. State legislatures approved medical cannabis (in
chronological order) in fourteen states: Hawaii, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Mexico, New
Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Illinois, Minnesota, New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia.
84
See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII § 16(3)(d) (West 2019) (effective Dec. 10, 2012).
85
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.010 (West 2019) (effective July 24, 2015).
86
Both states approved legalization through a popular voter initiative. See supra notes 81–
82.
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sale of cannabis as well as the creation of a regulated and taxed legal cannabis
industry. 87 Since 2012, nine other states have followed suit; recreational
marijuana is legal in ten states and the District of Columbia.88 So far, most
states that have legalized marijuana for recreational use has have done so by
ballot initiative, reflecting broad public consensus in support of legalization.
A number of additional states are considering legalization of
recreational marijuana in 2019 via legislative action. 89 States that already
have legalized recreational marijuana use also generally maintain medical
marijuana regimes, which cover different populations of cannabis users. 90
For example, persons under twenty-one are barred from recreational
marijuana use in all states that have legalized the drug, but may nevertheless
be eligible for medical marijuana prescriptions under some regimes.91
II. RATIONALES FOR AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGALIZATION
Persons advocating for changes in marijuana laws stress a variety of
themes in their successful quest. Some of those themes are pragmatic and
policy oriented. Many advocates, for example, argue that enforcement of
marijuana laws is extremely expensive, with valuable state revenues

87
See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII § 16(3)(d); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 69.51A.010 (West
2019) (effective July 24, 2015); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.38.010 (2018) (outlining
the regulation of marijuana); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 306.370 (2018) (Marijuana
Control Board rules for cannabis retail licensing).
88
Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada,
Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia have all legalized recreational
marijuana use. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11363.1 (West 2019) (effective June
27, 2017).
89
The New Jersey legislature passed bills to legalize recreational marijuana at the end of
2018, and the Governor in Connecticut made marijuana legalization part of his political
platform. See Alexandra Hutzler, Marijuana Legalization 2019: Which States Will Consider
Legal Weed in Year Experts Predict Will Be ‘Real Game-Changer,’ NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 2019,
https://www.newsweek.com/which-states-legalization-marijuana-2019-1275736 [https://per
ma.cc/JP35-JV76]. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo expressed interest in moving
forward with legalization. See id.
90
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.51A–69.51A.901 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 69.51A.010, 6951A.040 (2007) (collectively laying out ongoing scheme for regulating
medical marijuana).
91
Illinois’ medical marijuana scheme is fairly typical, for example—in Illinois, families
can obtain medical marijuana registry cards for minor patients who have qualifying conditions.
See Minor Qualifying Patient Application, ILL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, http://www.dph.illino
is.gov/topics-services/prevention-wellness/medical-cannabis/minorqualifyingpatients [https:/
/perma.cc/XL5J-XTL8].
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allocated for policing, prosecution, and incarceration. 92 They point out that
enforcement of marijuana laws, in addition to being an expense, distracts
police and courts from crime that is more socially significant. 93 At the same
time, they argue, expensive enforcement is not actually reducing marijuana
use—marijuana has been popular even in the face of enforcement.94 What
criminalization has done, in contrast, is create collateral crime, as people
engaged in illicit drug trade engage in violence and criminal organization in
order to protect that trade. 95
Advocates have also argued that the people who generally face arrest
and punishment for marijuana offenses are poor and/or members of minority
communities—meaning that enforcement is not just ineffective, but unjust. 96
92

See, e.g., Kathleen Gray, Proposal 1: Marijuana Legalization Passes in Michigan,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/
2018/11/06/marijuana-legal-michigan-results/1835274002/ [https://perma.cc/4DCQ-G9E5]
(spokesperson for legalization advocacy group supported state initiative, arguing that
“[l]egalization of marijuana will end the unnecessary waste of law enforcement resources used
to enforce the failed policy of prohibition while generating hundreds of millions of dollars
each year for Michigan’s most important needs”).
93
See, e.g., Brian Rogers, DA’s Pot Program Draws Mixed Reaction, Local, State
Officials Clash Over District Attorney’s Marijuana Policy, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2017,
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/DA-s-pot-program-d
raws-mixed-reaction-10939161.php [https://perma.cc/SS3E-Q4X3] (“District Attorney Kim
Ogg said the county’s resources would be better spent arresting serious criminals such as
burglars, robbers and rapists. ‘We have spent in excess of $250 million, over a quarter-billion
dollars, (over 10 years) prosecuting a crime that has produced no tangible evidence of
improved public safety,’ she said. ‘We have disqualified, unnecessarily, thousands of people
from greater job, housing and educational opportunities by giving them a criminal record for
what is, in effect, a minor law violation.’”); Rosenburg, supra note 75 (“Our research has
found virtually no public safety rationale for the ongoing arrest and prosecution of marijuana
smoking and no moral justification for the intolerable racial disparities that underlie
enforcement.”).
94
See, e.g., Marijuana Legalization and Regulation, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, http://
www.drugpolicy.org/issues/marijuana-legalization-and-regulation [https://perma.cc/55WMBGAX] (listing arguments for legalization and harping heavily on commonality of drug and
fiscal and safety benefits of legalizing and regulating).
95
See, e.g., Jamie Doward, Legal Marijuana Cuts Violence Says U.S. Study, as Medical
Use Laws See Crime Fall, GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2018/jan/14/legal-marijuana-medical-use-crime-rate-plummets-us-study [https://perma.cc/5
G9A-YM5L].
96
At a debate over Washington’s initiative that included Seattle City Attorney Pete
Holmes, a participant minister argued that the war on drugs had been a weapon of
“institutionalized racism” and “a war on black and brown people.” Jonathan Martin, Lively
Debate Over I-501, The Marijuana Measure, Draws Big Crowd at the UW, SEATTLE TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2012, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/lively-debate-over-i-502-the-mar
ijuana-measure-draws-big-crowd-at-the-uw/ [https://perma.cc/LUD9-K5QX]; see also
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Others say that as long as people will use marijuana, and as long as there is a
market for it, it makes sense to treat marijuana similarly to other substances,
like alcohol and tobacco, that are commonly used for recreation but carry
some deleterious effect. 97 Legislators can create a regulatory scheme to
control production and sales; 98 criminalize the aspects that are most socially
harmful (like driving under the influence or providing substances to
minors); 99 and, most importantly, tax it all at great financial benefit to the
state. 100
State voters and legislatures have quickly expanded marijuana
legalization despite the ongoing federal prohibition of all marijuana use
(including medical use) and concurrent federal jurisdiction over pertinent
criminal law pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act. 101 States largely
Christopher Ingraham, Sen. Cory Booker Puts Marijuana Legalization at the Center of his
New Racial Justice Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2017/08/01/cory-booker-puts-marijuana-legalization-at-the-center-of-his-new-raci
al-justice-bil/ [https://perma.cc/5C5A-3VPU] (“For decades, the failed War on Drugs has
locked up millions of nonviolent drug offenders — especially for marijuana-related offenses
— at an incredible cost of lost human potential, torn-apart families and communities, and
taxpayer dollars.”) (internal quotations omitted); Eve Peyser, Does your Senator Think Weed
Should be Legal?, VICE (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/59jqx3/whichsenators-by-state-support-legal-weed [https://perma.cc/K58D-NQ9M] (quoting Hawaii
Senator Brian Schatz: “‘[W]hile white people and people of color use marijuana at the same
rate, people of color are four times more likely to be arrested. So this is a matter of civil
justice’”); Rosenburg, supra note 75 (emphasizing racial disparities). There is a possible
counter-narrative in some jurisdictions; some legalization advocates have argued that
legalization will curtail the power of predatory “cartels,’ which likely are racialized as Latinx.
See, e.g., Tom Tancredo & John Southers, Counterpoint: Marijuana Legalization Amendment,
THE GAZETTE, Sept. 21, 2012, https://gazette.com/news/point-counterpoint-marijuana-legaliz
ation-amendment/article_141054ea-2b86-5f89-a838-2463257a1b39.html [https://perma.cc/7
MRG-ZECT] (“[N]arcoterrorists, who have operatives spread throughout the U.S., are
wreaking havoc on our southern borders and are a menace to American businesses with
operations in Mexico and South America.”).
97
See, e.g., No High Risk: Marijuana May Be Less Harmful Than Alcohol, Tobacco, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/legal-pot/marijuana-safer-alcoho
l-tobacco-study-shows-n312876 [https://perma.cc/DRA5-NEM8].
98
See, e.g., Congressman Introduces Federal Bill to Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol,
FOX 59 (January 13, 2019), https://fox59.com/2019/01/13/congressman-introduces-federal-bi
ll-to-regulate-marijuana-like-alcohol/ [https://perma.cc/UCF6-4TAV].
99
Washington’s recreational marijuana legalization process, for example, included
redrafting the state’s driving under the influence statute to deal more precisely with marijuana
usage. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.502 (eff. July 23, 2017).
100
See, e.g., Zoe Chevalier, Recreational Marijuana: A Business Boon for States?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 1, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2018
-08-01/the-legalization-of-recreational-marijuana-an-economic-opportunity-for-states [https:
//perma.cc/TN4S-JCV9].
101
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904 (West 2020).
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enjoy latitude to shape criminal marijuana laws despite federal law because
of the voluntary abstention on the part of the federal government; the Obama
Administration’s policy, as articulated in the Cole Memorandum, was not to
prosecute generic marijuana offenses in jurisdictions that had legalized its
use. 102 The Trump Administration rescinded the Cole Memorandum, and
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that marijuana remained a
federal law enforcement priority. 103 Sessions did, however, offer that federal
prosecutors still would not prosecute minor marijuana offenses, even though
federal law continued to prohibit marijuana possession. 104 Federal
prosecutors in states that have legalized generally seem uninterested in the
prospect of prosecuting marijuana offenses. 105
The process that has produced recreational marijuana legalization
provides particularly strong support for expunging or pardoning past
marijuana convictions. As will be noted, constitutional litigation has spurred
some of the most striking recent episodes of decriminalization; 106 such
decriminalization is no less salient or compelling because it has been required
by courts, but it does not necessarily reflect broad social consensus about the
102
This policy was announced in what has come to be known as the Cole Memorandum,
issued by then-Deputy Attorney General James Cole to federal prosecutors. While the Cole
Memorandum reminded federal prosecutors that marijuana remained illegal under federal law,
and provided that federal prosecutors would continue to prioritize enforcement where
enforcement implicated important federal priorities in eight specific areas (such as preventing
the use of firearms in drug trafficking and ensuring that minors did not use marijuana), the
memorandum also indicated that, outside of those prioritized categories, the federal
government would permit states that had legalized marijuana to make their own enforcement
decisions. Memorandum from James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. to All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29.
2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/KN6B-EXBX].
103
Then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a letter expressly rescinding the Cole
Memorandum and all other prior marijuana-specific guidelines for federal prosecution,
announcing that federal prosecutors should use only the general prosecution guidelines issued
by his office. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions III to All U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/3BV7-U
ZSE].
104
Max Greenwood, Sessions Says Despite Rules Change Federal Prosecutors Will Not
Take “Small Marijuana Cases,” THE HILL (Mar. 10, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/a
dministration/377750-sessions-says-despite-rules-change-federal-prosecutors-will-not-take
[https://perma.cc/L443-D9RT].
105
The U.S. Attorney for Colorado in fact announced that his office would not be
changing its policies on marijuana prosecution after the Cole Memorandum was rescinded.
See Kathleen Foody & Nicholas Riccardi, Colorado U.S. Prosecutor: No Change after
Sessions’ Pot Shift, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 4, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/
best-states/colorado/articles/2018-01-04/ex-pot-czar-says-sessions-move-intended-to-createchaos [https://perma.cc/J4QC-PPP5].
106
See infra notes 157–158.
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underlying behavior. Similarly, when Congress or state legislatures
decriminalize behavior, those legal changes do not necessarily reflect social
consensus in support of the change—it is more likely, because legislators
respond to the will of voters—but changes enacted by legislatures map
imperfectly onto public priorities because our representative government
does not require legislators to simply vote in the way the majority of
constituents wish them to.
Marijuana legalization is not a counter-majoritarian move by reformist
legislators educated about the harms of the War on Drugs or eager to raise
revenues without raising general taxes. Instead, marijuana legalization has
generally stemmed from popularly-approved state initiatives and
propositions. 107 While laws obviously are equally valid and binding whether
introduced by legislators or approved by voters, the fact that marijuana
legalization has been adopted via initiative and proposition suggests that
legalization reflects broad popular support for the notion that the underlying
activity ought not to be punished by criminal law. Criminal convictions
reflect social judgment—society disapproves of a particular activity such that
it is willing to subject an individual to state-sponsored opprobrium and
sanction. 108 This Article challenges the notion that drug laws generally, and
marijuana laws specifically, reflect social consensus on the appropriate ways
law and drugs should interact. Instead, laws criminalizing marijuana often
reflected the agendas of individual politicians or narrow private interests. 109
The fact that the citizens of a state affirmatively choose to permit legal
cultivation, use, and sale of marijuana provides a strong argument against
continuing to saddle persons convicted in the past with the legal and social
consequences of behavior the public now broadly approves.

107
To date, Vermont and Illinois are the only states that have legalized recreational
marijuana use through the legislative process rather than through a mechanism using direct
voter approval. See Jason Lemon, Vermont Recreational Marijuana Legalization, What is
Legal and What is Not?, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/vermontmarijuana-legalization-what-legal-what-not-1003482 [https://perma.cc/64YX-9GKW]; Dan
Petrella, Illinois House Approves Marijuana Legislation Bill Backed by Gov. J.B. Pritzker,
CHI. TRIB., May 31, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-met-illinois-recreation
al-marijuana-legislation-20190531-story.html [https://perma.cc/VBN2-Z8R8].
108
This point is central to criminal sanctions literature and to most of my work. See, e.g.,
Ahrens, supra note 36, at 1697 (“The adoption of legislation aimed at bullying and
cyberbullying is not just intended to combat the perceived problems, but to communicate that
those problems are being taken seriously.”).
109
See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 44, at 13.

402

AHRENS

[Vol. 110

That broad approval translates into notable profits for new marijuana
entrepreneurs, and sales in some states have crossed $1 billion. 110 States have
issued thousands of licenses for marijuana producers, processors,
transporters, and retailers. 111 Legal cannabis has become big business, which
was a desired end product of legalization efforts, rather than a happy and
unexpected side benefit. 112 Legalization efforts generally touted projected
tax revenue that would be collected from newly legal marijuana enterprises
and explicitly sold the idea of replacing the high public costs of the criminal
enforcement of marijuana laws with an influx of taxes that would support
education and other necessary public services. 113 States have indeed
collected substantial tax revenues (generally larger than initially projected)
from ongoing marijuana sales, and those revenues have increased over time
in the states that pioneered legalizing recreational marijuana. 114 States adopt

110
California has seen $2.75 billion in marijuana sales, while sales in Colorado are at
$1.56 billion and Washington State has reached $1 billion. See Andrew DePietro, Here’s How
Much Money States Are Raking In from Legal Marijuana Sales, FORBES (May 4, 2018), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/andrewdepietro/2018/05/04/how-much-money-states-make-cannabissales/#4a9418a5f181 [https://perma.cc/HGD9-XD83]. The wild success of legal marijuana
sales appears to be cutting into profits from illegal drug cartels. See Christopher Ingraham,
Legal Marijuana is Finally Doing What the Drug War Couldn’t, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/03/03/legal-marijuana-is-finally-doin
g-what-the-drug-war-couldnt/?utm_term=.8a44817ba55d [https://perma.cc/LK9A-737A].
111
Washington State has issued more than 1,000 licenses for cannabis-specific
businesses; of those, 507 have been for retail outlets; 167 for processors; 159 for producers;
thirteen for marijuana cooperatives; and eleven for marijuana transporters. See WASH. STATE
LIQUOR & CANNABIS BD.: ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2017 10 (2017), https://lcb.wa.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/annual_report/2017-annual-report-final2-web.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/89JH-DB34].
112
As noted above, see supra note 88, marijuana decriminalization is consistently paired
with legislation expressly creating a new, regulated, and taxed marijuana industry. Advocates
for legalizing recreational marijuana consistently argued that legalization would create jobs
and build business.
113
The Department of Revenue for the state of Colorado reports that in 2014, the state
collected a total of $67,594,323 in taxes, licenses, and fees related to marijuana; from January
to November in 2018 (the latest point for which data was available for this Article), Colorado
recorded $244,907,128 in taxes, licenses, and fees. See Colorado Dep’t of Rev., Marijuana
Tax Data, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/revenue/colorado-marijuana-tax-data [https://pe
rma.cc/PT99-YC88]. Washington State’s Liquor and Cannabis Board reports that in 2017, the
state collected $319 million in marijuana-related revenue; that figure was an increase from
$189 million in 2016 and $65 million in 2015. See WASH. STATE LIQUOR & CANNABIS BD.,
supra note 111, at 16.
114
See, e.g., Aaron Smith, The Legal Marijuana Industry Is Booming, CNBC (Jan 31,
2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/news/marijuana-state-of-the-union/index.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/59AW-2ZGT]; see also infra note 115.
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specific taxes on marijuana sales that garner the majority of revenues 115 but
also collect money from other marijuana business sources, particularly
through licenses and fees. 116 So far, concerns about collateral financial costs
of legalization—increased crime rates that might require greater state
funding to address—do not appear to have been realized. 117 Legalized
marijuana thus has provided both economic benefit to people in the industry
and broader benefit for people whose states have additional revenues that can
be deployed for public use.
Not everyone has received equal benefit from or access to marijuanarelated commerce. The licensing process for marijuana cultivators and
sellers limits the numbers and types of individuals who can enter the
market. 118 The overwhelming majority of persons who have founded or who
own cannabis businesses identify as white. 119 The expenses of entering the
115
States put into place cultivation taxes, sales taxes, and/or excise taxes; the sales tax on
marijuana in Washington is 37%, while Massachusetts levies a 6.25% sales tax on top of a
10.75% excise tax.
116
See, e.g., WASH. STATE LIQUOR & CANNABIS BD., supra note 111, at 16 (noting that of
the $319 million in marijuana-related revenues Washington State collected in 2018, all but $4
million reflected marijuana-specific sales taxes).
117
See Rosie McCall, Does Legalizing Pot Increase Crime Rates? It Hasn’t in Colorado
and Washington, A Study Has Found, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/
legalizing-pot-increase-crime-rates-colorado-washington-1463622 [https://perma.cc/49J7-C
CVQ] (reporting results of recent academic study and briefly mentioning earlier studies that
reached similar conclusions).
118
As this Article explores below, see infra note 123, one limitation is that persons with
past marijuana convictions are, in all but one legalization jurisdiction, barred from obtaining
the necessary licenses to operate marijuana-related businesses.
119
Complete data has not been gathered on the racial breakdown, but the data that exists,
consistently indicates that most marijuana business owners are white. Marijuana Business
Daily, a publication aimed at persons in the legal marijuana industry, conducted a survey of
389 marijuana-related business owners and founder, determining that 81% were white, as
compared to 5.7% Hispanic/Latinx; 4.3% black; 2.4% Asian; and 6.7% other. See Eli McVey,
Chart: Percentage of Cannabis Business Owners and Founders by Race, MARIJUANA BUS.
DAILY (Sept. 11, 2017), https://mjbizdaily.com/chart-19-cannabis-businesses-owned-founded
-racial-minorities/ [https://perma.cc/TWC6-UV3D]. Minority ownership rates vary from state
to state, and the presence of minority owners in the marijuana industry seems to be driven
primarily by California, where up to 40% of marijuana businesses are minority-owned. Id.
These figures likely overstate the participation of racial minorities in businesses that directly
cultivate, transport, or sell marijuana, however, as the survey included businesses that service
direct marijuana vendors, like law offices or public relations firms. Other smaller and more
geographically-specific surveys have reached similar conclusions. See Angela Bacca, The
Unbearable Whiteness of the Marijuana Industry, ALTERNET (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.alt
ernet.org/2015/04/incredible-whiteness-colorado-cannabis-business/ [https://perma.cc/W7K
C-9CS4] (84% of major marijuana retailers in Denver were white in 2015 when surveyed);
Michael Lyle, Marijuana’s Diversity Problem: Many Potential Black Entrepreneurs Are
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legal marijuana industry are formidable. Prospective business owners
generally need to pay high licensing application and annual licensing fees,120
and—in part because support for legalization derived from voter desire to
fund other public projects with marijuana revenue—marijuana business
owners also pay high taxes. 121 Some jurisdictions—mindful of past
inequalities in marijuana law enforcement—have made special efforts to
include minority communities generally, and persons affected by the War on
Drugs specifically, in marijuana commerce. 122 The barriers to market entry
for people with criminal convictions and without significant economic
resources, however, remain formidable, so the communities that are profiting
from legal marijuana are not the communities that were punished for
marijuana activity pre-legalization.
III. THE CASE FOR CLEARING MARIJUANA CONVICTIONS
A. A CLIMATE OF REFORM

The movement to legalize marijuana and expunge or pardon marijuana
convictions is only one part of a broader, recent trend towards incremental
criminal justice reform. While incarceration rates increased at a steady pace
since the early 1970s, they have levelled and modestly receded in the 2010s,
in part because of changes in criminal law. 123 Voters in the November 2018
Being Left Out of the Budding Industry, VEGAS INC., July 17, 2017, https://vegasinc.lasvegas
sun.com/business/2017/jul/17/marijuanas-diversity-problem-many-potential-black/ [https://p
erma.cc/5QRX-BULD] (noting that of the 148 marijuana businesses licensed in Nevada, only
five had black owners).
These statistics do not, however, necessarily reflect that rates of business ownership are
significantly different in the marijuana industry as compared to other small businesses. The
Census Bureau estimated that in 2014, about 17.5% of small businesses were owned by racial
minorities. See Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Nearly 1 in 10 Businesses with
Employees Are New, According to Inaugural Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-148.html [https://perma.cc/663
2-WXXM].
120
The high cost of licensing can be preclusive. In reflecting on low rates of minority
marijuana business ownership in Nevada, one black business owner said that “I think the
$250,000 [that applicants are required to be able to access in order to get a license] scared
people off.” See Lyle, supra note 119.
121
See WASH. STATE LIQUOR & CANNABIS BD., supra note 111.
122
Oakland, California, for example, created an equity program to try to incorporate
persons who either hail from neighborhoods significantly affected by drug prosecutions or
who were themselves convicted of drug offenses. See Alex Halperin, Cannabis Capitalism:
Who is Making Money in the Marijuana Industry?, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 3, 2018, https://
www.theguardian.com/society/2018/oct/03/cannabis-industry-legalization-who-is-making-m
oney [https://perma.cc/74CQ-5FPY].
123
See supra note 10.
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election approved not just marijuana legalization propositions, but a number
of other criminal justice reforms. Florida voters overwhelmingly approved a
constitutional amendment to re-enfranchise persons convicted of felony
offenses, 124 and voters across the country approved other ballot propositions
designed to reduce the imprint of mass incarceration or to combat perceived
excesses of police. 125 State legislatures continued to enact criminal justice
reforms, 126 and new reform proposals have already featured in 2019. 127
Congress passed the FIRST STEP Act (which, among other things,
retroactively applies the Fair Sentencing Act that had addressed sentencing
disparities between powder and crack forms of cocaine) by bipartisan
majorities with support from the president. 128 Openness to reform may
124

Sixty-four percent of Florida voters voted in favor of Amendment 4, which restores
voting rights to about 1.4 million persons convicted of felonies who had completed the terms
of their sentences but were barred under the state’s constitution from voting (the proposition
excluded persons convicted of murder and sexual offenses). See Skyler Swisher, Starting
Today, Ex-Felons Can Sign Up to Vote in Florida, SOUTH FLA. SUN SENTINEL, Jan. 8, 2019,
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/florida/fl-cb-amendment-4-explainer-20190107-story.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/29UY-J6RG].
125
Florida voters, in addition to approving Amendment 4, voted in favor of Amendment
11, repealing a state constitutional provision that barred legislators from amending criminal
statutes retroactively by, for example, lowering or eliminating mandatory minimum sentences
for particular offenses. See Frances Robles, 1.4 Million Floridians With Felonies Win LongDenied Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/0
7/us/florida-felon-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc/24LP-SF4B]. Louisiana voters
overwhelmingly approved Amendment 2, eliminating non-unanimous jury verdicts that had
long been criticized as designed to reduce the impact of black jurors. See Kevin McGill &
Rebecca Santana, Louisiana Votes to End Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Nov. 6, 2018, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/louisiana/articles/201
8-11-06/louisiana-decides-future-of-non-unanimous-jury-verdicts [https://perma.cc/CK7N-B
7NG].
126
Probably the most high-profile reform was California’s decision to retroactively
change its felony murder statute so that a person can only be convicted of murder where they
killed, intended to kill, or acted with reckless indifference to human life; a person cannot be
convicted of felony murder under other theories of accomplice liability, which both reduces
the number of persons prosecutable for felony murder and makes eligible for release a number
of persons who were convicted under prior law. See Jazmine Ulloa, California Sets New Limits
on Who Can Be Charged with Felony Murder, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2018, https://www.latim
es.com/politics/la-pol-ca-felony-murder-signed-jerry-brown-20180930-story.html [https://pe
rma.cc/ZM56-Y26M].
127
For example, New Mexico’s legislature is considering House Bill 57, which would
permit persons incarcerated in New Mexico—like similarly-situated people in Maine and
Vermont—to vote while still incarcerated. See New Mexico HB 57, 54th Leg. Sess. (2019).
128
The FIRST STEP Act changes some incarceration conditions for persons in federal
facilities—incarcerated persons will have access to expanded job training; will no longer be
shackled if pregnant; and are to be housed, if possible, within 500 miles of their families. The
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reflect a variety of inputs, including declining state budgets, growing
awareness of the racial impacts of policing and prosecution, and concern
about the effects of criminal justice. 129 Whatever the sources and
motivations, government actors and voters alike appear poised to consider
how to transform criminal justice at the present crossroads. Marijuana
convictions offer an excellent opportunity to think through how to deal with
the pervasive effects of mass incarceration.
B. CURRENT EFFORTS TO ERASE OR LIMIT MARIJUANA
CONVICTIONS

A number of jurisdictions have already begun the process of vacating
and expunging marijuana convictions as “a necessary step to right the wrongs
of what was a failed war on drugs.” 130 The clearance of past convictions for
now-legal behavior has been framed as one of justice and fairness. 131 These
initial efforts should be expanded to other legalized jurisdictions (and to new
Act also changes the sentences for some incarcerated persons by retroactively applying the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 to convicted persons sentenced under the prior, significantly
harsher guidelines for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. The Act finally reduces the
possible sentencing exposure for some convicted persons going forward by offering judges
more discretion to apply the Sentencing Guidelines’ safety valve. See H.R. 5682, 115th Cong.
(2018).
129
On the importance of breaking out of our recent politics of overcriminalization and the
reasons for optimism that we might be prepared to do so, see, for example, BARKOW, supra
note 35.
130
Mayor Jenny Durkan made this statement in announcing Seattle’s expungement policy
at a news conference, offering further that “For thousands of people in Washington State, a
misdemeanor conviction had huge implications: It could be a barrier to housing, to getting
credit, to getting good jobs and education. Gene Johnson, Seattle Clears Pot Convictions,
Following San Francisco Lead, AP NEWS, Feb. 8, 2018, https://apnews.com/dca0740b58de4
ff4be6ec1af07df45ee/Seattle-clears-pot-convictions,-following-San-Francisco-lead [https://p
erma.cc/E7NA-YPNJ]. Denver Mayor Michael Hancock, in announcing a similar policy
discussed supra note 30, offered in support of expungement the argument that “[f]or too long,
the lives of low-income residents and those living in our communities of color have been
negatively affected by low-level marijuana convictions . . . [t]his is an injustice that needs to
be corrected, and we are going to provide a pathway to move on from an era of marijuana
prohibition that has impacted the lives of thousands of people.” Andrew Kenney, Denver Will
Help Expunge Marijuana Convictions for 10,000-plus People, DENVER POST, Dec. 4, 2018,
https://www.denverpost.com/2018/12/04/denver-expunge-marijuana-records/ [https://perma.
cc/2H5V-M7UQ].
131
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio recently released a report advocating both
legalization and expungement, arguing that “[t]he time has come to rewrite the rules, to break
the mold of the past, to repair and redeem the lives of people who are treated unjustly.”
Matthew Chayes, NYC Mayor Backs Marijuana Legalization and Conviction Expungement,
Governing the States and Localities, TRIB. NEWS SERV. (Dec. 21, 2018), http://www.governi
ng.com/topics/public-justice-safety/tns-nyc-mayor-marijuana-legalization.html [https://perm
a.cc/TG5N-3FVF].
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jurisdictions that legalize) and should also be expanded beyond the categories
of offenses now eligible for clearance.
California’s approach to conviction clearance is the most extensive. In
2018, California adopted legislation that requires the expungement of certain
marijuana convictions; 132 the state adopted this legislation at the same time
that it legalized recreational marijuana, highlighting how inextricable the
issues of past conviction and present legalization have become. 133 The
legislation does not require individuals who have past convictions to initiate
the ordinary expungement process in order to clear their records. 134 Instead,
the legislation requires the California Department of Justice to review
criminal records in order to identify eligible convictions; misdemeanor
possession convictions (where the amount in personal possession would be
legal now under California law) are generally automatically expunged, while
felony convictions may be reduced to misdemeanor convictions. 135 This
provision applies to persons currently serving sentences for those felony
convictions, which means some persons convicted of marijuana offenses may
become eligible for release. 136
While California probably has the most comprehensive expungement
program, it was not the first state that decided to relieve people from the
effects of past convictions in light of legalization. When Oregon legalized
recreational marijuana in 2014, legalization was quickly followed by
legislation that permitted persons with minor marijuana convictions to
petition to have them sealed. 137 Like California, Oregon provides that
persons can petition to reduce some marijuana felonies to misdemeanors and,
after recent amendments, can petition to seal some felonies.138 Colorado,

132

See Assemb. B. 1793, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (adopting bill to automatically
expunge certain marijuana offenses where behavior is now legal under California law); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.9 (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2019) (code version of assembly
bill).
133
The Drug Policy Alliance described the measure as “reparative justice.” See Sophie
Quinton, In These States, Past Marijuana Convictions Can Go Away, THE PEW FOUND.:
STATELINE (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateli
ne/2017/11/20/in-these-states-past-marijuana-crimes-can-go-away [https://perma.cc/Z2UH-S
3QK].
134
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.9 (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2019).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
See Noel Crombie, Some Felony Pot Convictions Can be Sealed under New Oregon
Law, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 10 2015, https://www.oregonlive.com/marijuana/2015/11/most_
old_marijuana_convictions.html [https://perma.cc/R5V6-66ZJ]. The Oregon expungement
process requires applicants to pay fees. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (West 2019).
138
See id.
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which legalized recreational marijuana in 2012, 139 passed legislation to
permit persons convicted of low-level possession offenses (where underlying
conduct would be entirely legal under current Colorado law) to apply for
expungement. 140 Persons convicted under Colorado law must file a court
petition and pay fees in order to secure such an expungement. 141
Washington State started down a different path toward tackling past
convictions. 142 Governor Inslee announced that the executive will use its
pardon power to forgive past convictions; eligible convictions will be those
between 1998 and 2012 (the year of legalization), and the only convictions
eligible for action will be misdemeanor possession convictions on otherwiseempty criminal records.143 The process does not appear to contemplate any
sort of notice or objection component, nor does it appear to contemplate an
exercise of discretion beyond that offered to set the eligibility criteria for the
pardon program itself. The pardon program provides an online link where
people with eligible convictions can apply through a much-streamlined
pardon process; it does rely on eligible persons to come forward on their
own. 144 The state legislature has more recently passed legislation that will
offer an expungement process for low-level convictions similar to that
provided in other states. 145

139

See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII § 16(3)(d) (West 2019) (effective Dec. 10, 2012).
See Lee V. Gaines, How Do You Clear a Pot Conviction from Your Record?, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT, Nov. 27, 2017, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/27/how-doyou-clear-a-pot-conviction-from-your-record [https://perma.cc/MRB9-MJ8D] (discussing
Colorado statute and putting it in context).
141
So far, the state has not agreed to identify convictions; individuals wishing to be
pardoned would need to take initiative. While some jurisdictions in Colorado have taken the
initiative to identify eligible convictions and have offered to have prosecutors complete the
paperwork to expunge convictions, those offices still generally at this point plan to rely on
people with convictions to come forward and work with them or apply through an online
process. See Mitchell Byars, Boulder County DA Looking to Dismiss Thousands of Past
Marijuana Possession Convictions, DAILY CAMERA, Nov. 30, 2018, http://www.dailycamera.
com/news/boulder/ci_32302890/boulder-county-da-looking-dismiss-thousands-past-marijua
na [https://perma.cc/DMV8-E7P2] (noting also that the Boulder district attorney hopes
eventually to complete the expungement process for eligible persons who do not contact his
office).
142
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Governor’s proposal).
143
Press Release, Washington Governor Jay Inslee, Inslee Announces Initiative to Pardon
Marijuana Misdemeanors (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-a
nnounces-initiative-pardon-marijuana-misdemeanors [https://perma.cc/LD9H-825R].
144
Id.
145
See Paul Armentano, Washington: Governor Signs Marijuana Expungement Bill Into
Law, NORML BLOG (May 14, 2019), https://blog.norml.org/2019/05/14/washington-governor
-signs-marijuana-expungement-bill-into-law/ [https://perma.cc/UZ4L-LEFM].
140
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Other states are considering similar measures. Michigan governor
Gretchen Whitmer has said that she will consider expunging misdemeanor
marijuana convictions following the state’s adoption of a ballot measure to
legalize recreational marijuana.146 The expungement movement also extends
to city jurisdictions that have prosecuted marijuana offenses under municipal
law (convictions that would not be relieved by state expungement efforts).
Individual cities announced such expungement processes in 2018, including
San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, and Denver. 147 These proposals and
programs vary in terms of their criteria, but they generally are limited to
misdemeanor convictions, convictions that occurred within a particular time
period, and people without other criminal histories. 148 Even some
jurisdictions that have not fully legalized marijuana have considered or
passed legislation to permit clearance of certain misdemeanor possession
convictions. 149 Not every jurisdiction that has legalized recreational
146
See Jonathan Oosting, Whitmer Will Consider Forgiving Marijuana Crimes, DETROIT
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2018, https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/11/07/gr
etchen-whitmer-considers-forgiving-marijuana-crimes-michigan/1919044002/ [https://perm
a.cc/E2AR-WHN9].
147
In 2018, San Francisco District Attorney George Gascon announced that his office
would automatically expunge about 3,000 misdemeanor convictions and consider whether an
additional 4,900 felony convictions should be downgraded to misdemeanors; San Diego
identified about 4,700 cases that its District Attorney’s office planned to expunge or
downgrade. Timothy Williams & Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Will Clear Thousands of
Marijuana Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/31/us/
california-marijuana-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/7UN4-A49W]. Seattle followed
suit about a week later. See Johnson, supra note 130. Denver also announced at the end of
2018 that it would proactively work to expunge about 10,000 records of low-level
misdemeanor marijuana offenses. See Kenney, supra note 130. On January 9, 2019, the Mayor
rolled out his “Turn Over a New Leaf” program, which will offer both online access to
expungement applications and live clinics for persons who wish to seek expungement; at these
clinics, applicants will meet with representatives from the district attorney’s office who will
evaluate the eligibility of individuals for expungement and will complete the necessary
paperwork if they find a conviction to be eligible. The program also will provide immigration
attorneys to advise individuals about the possibility that an expungement application might
bring an individual to the attention of immigration authorities. Bobbi Sheldon, You Can Apply
to Expunge Marijuana Convictions under New Denver Program, 9NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.9news.com/article/news/local/you-can-apply-to-have-marijuana-convictions-ex
punged-under-new-denver-program/73-613378e0-0a68-4e64-a2a3-dda0bb04b297 [https://p
erma.cc/F8R7-SZRM].
148
Governor Inslee’s proposal, for example, is limited to individuals who have a single
misdemeanor marijuana conviction on their adult record since 1998. GOVERNOR’S MARIJUANA
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, July 4, 2019, https://www.governor.wa.gov/marijuanajustice [https://per
ma.cc/ER9W-UPWN].
149
Maryland did not legalize marijuana in the manner discussed in this Article; it
decriminalized low-level marijuana possession by converting it from a criminal offense into a
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marijuana has decided to address past convictions—in fact, Nevada’s
governor vetoed legislation that would have vacated low-level possession
convictions. 150 Still, there is clearly an openness to reducing the effects of
past marijuana convictions, and a number of jurisdictions have considered or
passed legislation and executive orders to begin the process of clearing
convictions. Some jurisdictions now offer specific expungement or pardon
processes for low-level marijuana convictions even though the jurisdictions
have not formally legalized recreational marijuana.151 There is not, however,
a great deal of theory on why or when we should remove past marijuana
convictions.

fine-only civil infraction. In 2016, Maryland passed legislation that made many more offenses
eligible for expungement than had enjoyed eligibility under prior law; certain marijuana
possession offenses that preceded decriminalization now are eligible for expungement. New
Hampshire also has not legalized recreational marijuana as of this writing, but New Hampshire
HB 1477 would have established an annulment procedure for arrests and convictions of
marijuana offenses involving less than three-fourths of an ounce of the drug. The measure
provided that a person could petition the court with a qualifying arrest or conviction and
provide notice to the prosecutor; the prosecutor would then have ten days if he or she wished
in which to request a hearing, but, otherwise, the court would grant the annulment request. If
the prosecutor were to request a hearing, the prosecutor would have the burden of persuading
the court that the underlying offense actually involved more than three-fourths of an ounce of
marijuana; otherwise, the court would grant the annulment petition. See Douglass Dowty, 100s
of Pot Convictions to be Tossed Under DA Plan: ‘A Simple Matter of Justice’, SYRACUSE.COM
(Jan. 25, 2019) https://www.syracuse.com/news/2019/01/100s-of-pot-convictions-tossed-u
nder-das-plan-a-simple-matter-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/NVK9-CGCC] (describing
Syracuse District Attorney’s plan to offer expungement for marijuana convictions in
anticipation of, but prior to, state legalization of recreational marijuana).
150
Governor Brian Sandoval in 2017 vetoed legislation that would have required judges
to seal records and vacate judgments where a person had been convicted of a marijuana offense
where Nevada law now permits the conduct. See H.R. 259, 2017 Nev. Leg. 79th Sess. (Nev.
2017). In his veto statement, Governor Sandoval noted that individuals with criminal records
could on a case-by-case basis apply for relief under existing state sealing and expungement
processes. Chris Kudialis, Sandoval Signs 3 Marijuana Bills into Law, Vetoes One, LAS VEGAS
SUN, June 13, 2017, https://lasvegassun.com/news/2017/jun/13/sandoval-signs-3-marijuanabills-into-law-vetoes-o/ [https://perma.cc/W37D-6563]. Washington’s legislature also
considered but has failed to pass marijuana convictions expungement bills; Governor Inslee’s
offer of pardons to low-level marijuana offenders cam on the heels of multiple attempts for
the state legislation to pass a bill requiring judges to vacate convictions for possession of less
than 40 grams of marijuana. See Quinton, supra note 133.
151
See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, About 160,000 People in New York to See Their Marijuana
Convictions Disappear, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/28/n
yregion/marijuana-records-new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/7JA7-G27W].
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C. PRIOR EPISODES OF DECRIMINALIZATION AND
LEGALIZATION

The legalization of marijuana use and trade is not the first time that the
United States has decriminalized or legalized behavior that had previously
been subject to sanction. 152 Surprisingly, however, there has not been a great
deal of systemic mitigation of criminal convictions where past behavior is no
longer subject to criminal sanction, nor discussion of how to do so. 153 There
may be a number of reasons for this. One, that one-way ratchet described
above has meant that in general, criminal law is always expanding, rather
than contracting. 154 The common wisdom has been that politicians do not
get elected through leniency on crime, 155 so there simply has not been much
formal decriminalization, and therefore little need to determine what to do
with past convictions. Even when decriminalization has taken place, the
pressure to appear tough on lawbreakers may make formal expungement or
pardons politically unappealing. A second reason may be that much
decriminalization occurs piecemeal and through constitutional litigation,
rather than through any form of democratic legislation or popular initiative,
which means that legislators have not been the prime movers on
decriminalization and perhaps have not had much incentive to treat past
convictions systemically. For example, the general decriminalization of
interracial romantic relationships was the product of Supreme Court
decision-making, rather than legislative deliberation. 156 Similarly, the

152
See infra notes 156–157 and accompanying text (discussing experience of
decriminalizing interracial marriage, same-sex sexual activity, and alcohol possession and
sale).
153
See infra notes 165–166 and accompanying text (discussing lack of evidence of
systematic pardons in the aftermath of Prohibition).
154
See supra note 9 and works cited therein.
155
While there may or may not be any empirical support for the proposition that being
tough on crime was ever necessary for electability, the Willie Horton/Michael Dukakis
campaign advertisement in 1988 persuaded many people that appearing lenient would be a
liability. See, e.g., Morgan Whitaker, The Legacy of the Willie Horton Ad Lives On, 25 Years
Later, MSNBC (Oct. 21, 2013, 10:30 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-legacy-the-wi
llie-horton-ad-lives [https://perma.cc/SG7R-YRK8]. This perceived need to appear tough on
crime drove major changes in controlled substance sentencing. See, e.g., Arit John, Timeline
of the Rise and Fall of “Tough on Crime” Drug Sentencing, THE ATLANTIC, Apr. 22, 2014, ht
tps://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-toughon-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/ [https://perma.cc/AJ8X-J9VJ].
156
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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decriminalization of consensual same-sex sexual activity was effectuated by
a Supreme Court decision. 157
Finally, and perhaps most saliently, criminal convictions did not have
as much effect in the past—prior to the era of mass incarceration,
substantially fewer people had criminal convictions at all. 158 And, the ability
to obtain knowledge about another person’s criminal convictions—whether
that person was a potential employee, tenant, or friend—was much more
limited. 159 Landlords and employers were less likely to perform criminal
history checks. 160 The Internet provides individuals who might once have
had to scrutinize local newspaper announcements or take enough interest to
research in person at a court clerk’s office with the ability to quickly, easily,
and at little to no cost discover a wealth of information about a person,
including records for arrest and criminal conviction. 161 The ease of obtaining
this information, combined with increasingly strict identification
requirements, has made the existence of criminal convictions easier for any
interested party to obtain and use against that person. 162
Still, the issue of what to do with past convictions for behavior that no
longer is criminalized has some precedent; both states and the federal
government prosecuted and convicted people during the Eighteenth

157
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)). In the United Kingdom, similar acts were decriminalized in 1967. In 2016,
the United Kingdom formally pardoned persons who had been convicted under defunct
sodomy statutes—an estimated 65,000 men were so convicted, and approximately 15,000
were still alive at the time of pardon. Michael Holden, UK to Pardon Thousands of Gay Men
Convicted Under Defunct Laws, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/u
s-britain-gays-pardon/uk-to-pardon-thousands-of-gay-men-convicted-under-defunct-laws-id
USKCN12K1BB [https://perma.cc/JFE2-PYFQ].
158
See Gary Fields & John M. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/article
s/as-arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 [https:
//perma.cc/UM9A-J634].
159
See id.
160
See id.
161
See id.
162
In fact, one difficulty with this Article’s proposal is that convictions and arrests—
despite attempts at reform—are likely to persist, ghostlike, on the internet. Even if official
public records no longer contain a conviction, private companies that aggregate such
information may not delete the convictions, and prior caches of public records may still reflect
arrests and convictions. There are a few possible responses here. Formally, jurisdictions could
explore the possibility of legislation that would require private companies to delete arrest and
conviction records under particular condition. Realistically, hopefully, if potential landlords,
employers, friends, and other curious parties do not see a reflection of an official conviction,
they will be less likely to apply the same consequences to an individual.
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Amendment’s Prohibition period, for example. 163 While there is some
evidence that legislatures considered pardoning or otherwise limiting past
convictions following the amendment’s repeal, there is no record that any
legislature or executive formally did so; it appears that persons with
convictions for alcohol-related offenses served out sentences handed down
prior to repeal and maintained records of conviction. 164 It is possible that
such efforts faded in part because the stigma carried by violations of liquor
laws was not serious. 165 Efforts also would have been somewhat diffuse, as
some states maintained laws criminalizing alcohol-related activity even after
repeal, and many persons connected to illicit liquor activity were convicted
of non-liquor offenses in addition to, or instead of, direct alcohol offenses. 166
D. MARIJUANA PROSECUTIONS AND SYSTEMATIC INJUSTICE

The effort to legalize marijuana also has reflected awareness of the past
injustice and unfairness of punishing persons for marijuana-related offenses.
The early medical marijuana movement centered around the stories of
unreasonable prosecutions against terminally-ill individuals. 167 Advocates
163
For a discussion of prohibition-era prosecutions, see DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE
RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION, 253–66 (2010).
164
I combed through legislative records and could not find any statute that a legislature
passed to expunge convictions, nor could I find any indication of mass pardons. The only
indication that I could find that persons might have been pardoned was in a statement in a
short online article indicating that some individual pardons may have occurred, but no mass
or automatic pardons. See Vicki Denig, Were Bootleggers Released When Prohibition
Ended?, VINEPAIR (Dec. 7, 2016), https://vinepair.com/articles/violators-prohibition-serve-fu
ll-sentence-post-repeal/ [https://perma.cc/8JFR-SVHZ]; see also Email from Dr. Engs,
Professor Applied Health Sci., Indiana Univ., to author (Nov. 5, 2018, 1:19 PM PST) (on file
with author) (One of the sources quoted in that article and an academic researcher on this
subject noted that she had “heard” that about a third of bootleggers had been individually
pardoned, but was not sure if that statistic was accurate or where it originated.).
165
Juries often were loath to convict under state versions of the federal Volstead Act,
effectively nullifying the law because they did not think punishment was appropriate. See
OKRENT, supra note 163, at 253.
166
This will also be the case with many people convicted based on illegal activity
associated with marijuana as well; some people will have been convicted only of marijuana
offenses, while others also will have been convicted of other non-drug offenses, and still others
will have pleaded guilty to a non-drug offense based on conduct associated with marijuana
use or trade. See generally supra Part III.F (discussing scope of eligibility for relief and noting
that offense of conviction often tells us more about policing and prosecutorial discretion than
it does about underlying conduct).
167
California’s medical marijuana initiative was coordinated by activists who highlighted
the unfairness of jailing persons who used marijuana in treatment associated with HIV/AIDS
and other serious illnesses. See Zachary Zane, The Medical Marijuana Movement Was at a
Standstill Until AIDS Activists Stepped In, OUT MAG., June 26, 2018, https://www.out.com/n
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highlighted the inappropriateness of punishment against people who were
sick, in pain, and able to better manage symptoms with marijuana use; they
did not just argue that medical marijuana prosecutions were impractical, but
immoral. 168 As advocacy began to focus on recreational marijuana,
advocates have highlighted two arguments: one, as this Article outlined
above, has been the economic benefits of legalized marijuana commerce. 169
But the other has been the injustice—and, particularly, the race and classbased injustice—of how marijuana offenses have been and continue to be
prosecuted. Advocates note the exceptional impact that criminalizing
marijuana has had on poor communities and minority communities 170 and
make the case that part of the reason for creating a legal marijuana industry
is not just so that states can raise tax revenues and entrepreneurs can create
jobs and profits, but because enforcement of marijuana laws has been
harmful. 171 Marijuana reformers also have been persuasive in arguing that
ews-opinion/2018/6/26/medical-marijuana-movement-was-standstill-until-aids-activists-step
ped [https://perma.cc/G8M8-6XN5].
168
See, e.g., Michael Pollan, Living With Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997,
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/magazine/living-with-medical-marijuana.html [https://
perma.cc/P796-FKGN].
169
See supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text.
170
See, e.g., Stevie Johnson, Here are Kristen Gillibrand’s Stances on Marijuana,
Russian Meddling, NRA and Health Care, ROCHESTER DEM. & CHRON. NEWS, July 20, 2018,
https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2018/07/20/kirsten-gillibrand-town-hallmcc-rochester-senator-marijuana-russian-meddling-nra-health-car/810776002/ [https://perm
a.cc/H8UU-52ZZ] (quoting Senator Kirsten Gillibrand: “I think the ways the laws are applied
are so disproportionate toward people of color. If you’re African-American or Latino you are
four times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession. In New York City you’re 10
times as likely to be arrested for possession. I think that’s outrageous and an injustice.”); Tal
Kopan, Cannabis reform no laughing matter for Oakland Rep. Barbara Lee, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
22, 2019, https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Cannabis-reform-no-laughing-matterfor-Oakland-13552373.php [https://perma.cc/7UM5-LXT4] (advocating for reforms because
marijuana laws reflect “‘a systemic racism, and institutional racism and injustice in our
criminal justice system’ . . . ‘When you look at who’s in prison, who’s in jail, whose lives
have been shattered by marijuana charges—who is it? It’s black young people; it’s brown
young people. And so we have to stop that.’”).
171
See, e.g., Matt Laslo, Why Democrats Should Embrace Pot for the Midterms, ROLLING
STONE, Oct. 28, 2018, https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/democrats-wee
d-pot-midterm-elections-747138/ [https://perma.cc/DD4E-XCTB] (quoting New Jersey
Representative Tom Malinowski: “‘There’s no good rationale for locking up a lot of young
people up for marijuana,’ says Malinowski, a human rights activist. ‘And if that’s going to be
our judgement going forward then we also need justice looking backward.’”); Carly Sitrin,
State Suspends Low-Level Marijuana Cases Until September—For a Start, N.J. SPOTLIGHT,
July 25, 2018, https://www.njspotlight.com/stories/18/07/25/nj-suspends-low-level-marijuan
a-cases-until-september-for-a-start/ [https://perma.cc/EL3Y-6TXK] (quoting NJ Attorney
General as stating “[a] single marijuana conviction can have devastating consequences,
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recreational marijuana carries similar or perhaps lesser harms than other
substances people use recreationally. 172 People within communities that
have been harmed by marijuana enforcement efforts are attuned to the
disconnect between current commerce and past carceral treatment and
express concern and resentment about the differences in legal regimes.173
E. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS.

Many people in jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana currently are
incarcerated for marijuana offenses or are otherwise under community

including fines, incarceration, job loss, and effects on housing and immigration status,
affecting not just the individual, but also their families and communities”); Brooke Staggs,
People with Marijuana on their Record Can Clear it Up; Most Haven’t, ORANGE CTY. REG.,
Mar. 23, 2018, ocregister.com/2018/03/23/people-with-marijuana-on-their-record-can-clearit-up-most-havent/ [https://perma.cc/5NVB-XD3G] (“‘A criminal conviction can be a barrier
to employment, housing and other benefits,’ [San Francisco District Attorney George] Gascón
said. ‘So instead of waiting for the community to take action, we’re taking action for the
community.’”).
172
Marijuana advocates generally extoll the benefits of marijuana use—aided in part by
the fact that the majority of states now permit its use for medical purposes—and compare the
detrimental effects of use favorably with alcohol. Advocates argue that alcohol use tends to
occur in public, carrying possibilities for violence, driving under the influence, and other acts
of dangerous decision making, while marijuana use tends to occur at home, where people are
less likely to pose a social danger. There are arguments that marijuana does pose additional
dangers. One of the primarily arguments against legalization has been the possibility of an
increase in persons driving under the influence of marijuana; the argument has been that (1)
more individuals will use marijuana when it is legal than not, increasing the number of
potential drivers using marijuana; (2) it will be more difficult to determine whether or not
someone is under the influence of marijuana while driving than it would be with alcohol,
because of the different ways in which bodies metabolize marijuana, and because standard
roadside sobriety tests are less able to detect stoned drivers; and (3) people may not realize
they are too intoxicated to drive, or might not realize that driving under the influence of
marijuana is in fact illegal, or might erroneously believe they are better drivers while under
the influence. See Maggie Koerth-Baker, Driving under the Influence, of Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/18/health/driving-under-the-influen
ce-of-marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/M9V3-PNJ9]. Although these concerns are salient,
researchers have suggested that marijuana is likely less of a driving risk factor than alcohol.
Id.
173
In a local Seattle conflict over the location of a pot shop next to a black church, one
church member said, “It’s very emotional for me to see this pot shop open here. Many of us
were born and raised here and know people who went to jail for selling pot. To see the legal
sales being protected here just feels hypocritical.” Alexa Vaughn, Church Members Protest
Seattle Pot Shop as Too Close for Comfort, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 2014, https://www.seattl
etimes.com/seattle-news/church-members-protest-seattle-pot-shop-as-too-close-for-comfort/
[https://perma.cc/SSG6-TKRP].
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supervision and control, which directly affects them and their families. 174
This Article advocates that those convictions should be cleared and all
convicted persons should be released from the terms of sentence for the
marijuana conviction. Many of the other direct effects of criminal
conviction, however, go beyond those explicitly provided for in a criminal
sentence. A person convicted of a crime does not escape the consequences
of that conviction just because time passes or the behavior is decriminalized.
And people convicted of marijuana offenses remain incarcerated in
jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana possession and sale; this is
especially so for individuals convicted of offenses higher than possession. 175
Others remain on probation, parole, or community supervision for those
offenses. 176 Still others are in the process of resolving legal and financial
obligations attendant to conviction—fines and court fees that are particularly
burdensome for the vast majority of criminal defendants who are indigent. 177
Collateral consequences—which may as a practical matter restrict a
person more than the direct criminal law sentence—also flow from
conviction. 178 People who are no longer dealing with direct sentencing
consequences for criminal convictions still grapple with formal civil legal
174

About half of American adults have or have had an incarcerated immediate family
member. Percentages are higher for racial minorities—while about 42% of white Americans
have had this experience, that figure rises to 48% of Latinx Americans and 62% of black
Americans and Native Americans. These figures also vary by income—half of Americans
making under $25,000 per year have had an immediate family member incarcerated, while
that figure is one-third for people making over $100,000. See Rachel Weiner, Almost Half of
U.S. Adults Have Seen a Family Member Jailed, Study Shows, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2018, htt
ps://www.washingtonpost.com/crime-law/2018/12/06/almost-half-us-adults-have-seen-famil
y-member-jailed-study-shows/?utm_term=.1182b84b06c8 [https://perma.cc/KS4M-FTPK]
(reporting results of Cornell University study).
175
Jurisdictions may permit conviction for drug offenses higher than possession in cases
where an individual is found in possession of quantity of drug that is larger than a statutory
presumption of intent to sell/traffic; appears to be packaged for sale or distribution; or is
located in conjunction with tools, paperwork, or other items supporting an inference of intent
to sell/traffic. See, e.g., McRae v. United States, 148 A.3d 269, 273 (D.C. 2016) (noting that
an intent to distribute marijuana may be inferred from quantity, paraphernalia, and packaging).
176
See Alexi Jones, Correctional Control 2018: Incarceration and Supervision by State,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/correctionalcont
rol2018.html [https://perma.cc/MNL7-8C4K] (reporting that approximately 4.5 million
Americans were on probation or parole or otherwise under community supervision).
177
Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtor’s
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 7–8 (2018) (referring to fees and fines imposed on indigent
defendants as a “poverty penalty”).
178
At least one scholar has argued that collateral consequences are sufficiently
burdensome that jurisdictions should consider them as harms when determining whether or
not it is wrongful to criminalize behavior in the first place. Zachary Hoskins, Criminalization
and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 625, 635–37 (2017).
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restrictions that forbid them from fully engaging with their communities.
Persons convicted of felony offenses are in many jurisdictions temporarily or
permanently disenfranchised from voting, preventing them from engaging in
the basic democratic process of shaping the laws that govern them. 179 Drug
convictions bar people from access to income assistance, 180 federal
housing 181 and federal financial aid, 182 preventing them from being able to
access welfare support, affordable places to live, or support for educational
and career advancement. Convictions prevent people from serving on
juries, 183 hindering them from being a part of the body that determines
whether another person will also be subject to criminal sanction. The
inability to participate is itself a limitation, and it also stigmatizes the
individual as someone who cannot participate appropriately in public
processes. People may experience issues with family formation through
fostering or adoption. 184 Persons with criminal convictions also are subject
to deportation, 185 which has been an increasingly salient consequence for
criminal conviction in recent years. 186
Outside of formal criminal and civil legal constraints, persons with
conviction records also face professional, social, and personal barriers to
179
See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/2018.1
2.07_Criminal_Disenfranchisement_Map.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SCQ-LY9Q] (cataloging
such laws).
180
See 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2014).
181
See 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(ii)(C) (2016); see also Marah A. Curtis et al., Alcohol,
Drug, and Criminal History Restrictions in Public Housing, 15 CITYSCAPE: J. OF POL’Y DEV.
& RES. 37, 43–44 (2013), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol15num3/c
h2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K7F-LGYE].
182
See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r) (2019); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17691, NONVIOLENT DRUG CONVICTIONS: STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON POTENTIAL ACTIONS TO
ADDRESS COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 11 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/688187.p
df [https://perma.cc/9BD2-2PZX].
183
See 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2000); NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
OF CONVICTION, https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/database/results/ [https://perma.cc/V9AMW346] (select keyword filter “jury service”).
184
See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 111 STAT. 2115 (1997).
185
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(a)(2)(B) (setting out deportation as consequence of drug
convictions for non-citizens, but including a marijuana-specific exception for “a single offense
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana”). For a detailed look
at marijuana’s immigration consequences, see generally W. Scott Railton, Marijuana and
Immigration, 32 CRIM. JUST. 14 (2017) [https://perma.cc/LV7M-WLXK].
186
Criminal convictions may render a person eligible for deportation. In Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Supreme Court acknowledged the impact of deportation
as a consequence of a guilty plea and held that a person could demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment where an attorney offered faulty advice to
a person whose guilty plea rendered him automatically eligible for deportation.
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community integration. People experiencing custody disputes have more
difficulty retaining custody when judges take criminal convictions into
account in evaluating the best interests of the child.187 Criminal histories
affect employment. 188 Employers often ask for criminal history and refuse
to hire on the basis of prior convictions; recognition of the serious effects
criminal convictions have on the ability of persons to obtain employment has
led some jurisdictions to adopt “ban the box” legislation that prohibits
employers from asking about criminal histories on initial job applications. 189
Landlords also routinely perform background checks on potential tenants and
refuse to rent to persons convicted of crimes. 190 Schools perform criminal
background checks on parent volunteers and may deny parents with criminal
histories the ability to chaperone field trips or assist teachers in class. 191
187

E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403.04 (2013) (“If the court determines that a parent has
abused drugs or alcohol or has been convicted of any drug offense . . . within twelve months
before the petition . . . is filed, there is a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint legal
decision-making by that parent is not in the child’s best interests.”); accord GA. CODE ANN.
§ 19-9-3 (2017) (“In determining the best interests of the child, the judge may
consider . . . criminal history of either parent; and . . . substance abuse by either parent.”); see
also Jesse Krohn & Jaime Gullen, Mothers in the Margins: Addressing the Consequences of
Criminal Records for Young Mothers of Color, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 237, 259–61 (2017);
Tamar Lerer, Sentencing the Family: Recognizing the Needs of Dependent Children in the
Administration of the Criminal Justice System, 9 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 24 (2013).
188
See JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 258 (2014).
189
The California legislature, for example, adopted such a provision in 2018, prohibiting
employers from asking about criminal history during either the initial application or interview
process; employers may only request criminal history after making a conditional offer of
employment. The law also prohibits employers from considering arrests that did not lead to
charges; successfully completed pretrial diversion programs; and convictions that have been
sealed, dismissed, or expunged. See CAL. GOV’T § 12952 (2019). Other states and localities
have adopted similar measures. See Matt Boyer, Tiptoeing the Minefield: Avoiding the Pitfalls
of Background Checks, Negligent Hiring, and ‘Ban the Box’ Legislation, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q.
6, 10 (2015) (listing a number of states and localities that have adopted various forms of “ban
the box” laws).
190
See Merf Ehman & Anna Reosti, Tenant Screening in an Era of Mass Incarceration:
A Criminal Record is No Crystal Ball, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y QUORUM 1, 16–22
(2015); see also OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPT. HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDANCE
ON APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY
PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS (2016), https://www.
hud.gov/sites/documents/hud_ogcguidappfhastandcr.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4TP-QNZE].
191
It is unclear how widespread criminal background checks are for parent volunteers, but
they are not isolated. Several years ago, after a parent supervising a field trip for an elementary
school in Seattle noticed that another supervising parent was a person she recognized as having
an outstanding criminal warrant, the Seattle Public Schools began enforcing a requirement
that parent volunteers submit to a criminal background check. See Donald Vassar, Parent
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Professional licensing organizations also frequently exclude persons
with criminal convictions—such organizations control entry to fields ranging
from law to home health care. 192 Perhaps most ironically for the purposes of
this Article, while the legal marijuana business thrives and marijuana
entrepreneurs make comfortable profits, people who engaged in marijuana
trade prior to legalization are barred in many jurisdictions from becoming
licensed to be involved in this expanding economic sector. 193 The people
who built the market and served the customer for years, in other words, now
cannot use that professional expertise or take advantage of the new legal drug
economy.
Less formally, persons with criminal convictions are stigmatized
socially. 194 The designation of a person as “a criminal” is one that sets the
person aside within his or her community; in turn, many people in the
community take this designation to mean that those convicted of crimes are
to be shunned or avoided because of the harm they have caused to society. 195
The stigma of felony conviction is particularly notable; media sources and
laypeople alike often refer to people convicted of felony offenses by the title
“felons.” 196 Demarcation as “a criminal” is a demarcation as “other,” and a
Spots Fugitive on Field Trip, SEATTLE PI, Dec. 15, 2011, https://www.seattlepi.com/local/ko
mo/article/Parent-spots-fugitive-on-school-field-trip-2403717.php [https://perma.cc/4YAT-E
2M2]; see also Kirk Johnson, Oregon’s Legal Sale of Marijuana Comes with Reprieve, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20. 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/us/oregons-legal-sale-of-mariju
ana-comes-with-reprieve.html [https://perma.cc/R7SZ-FZ49] (profiling a woman who was
required to disclose her fifteen-year-old misdemeanor marijuana conviction on school
volunteer applications).
192
See generally MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, UNLICENSED AND
UNTAPPED: REMOVING BARRIERS TO STATE OCCUPATIONAL LICENSES FOR PEOPLE WITH
RECORDS, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT (2016), https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Unlice
nsed-Untapped-Removing-Barriers-State-Occupational-Licenses.pdf [https://perma.cc/69G4
-LKCY].
193
A few jurisdictions have recognized that such requirements exclude people who might
become gainfully employed in the marijuana industry, and that those people are excluded
based more on bad luck and demographics than on behavior that historically differed from
people who can get licenses everywhere; Oakland, for example, has specifically reached out
to such individuals. See Max Blau, Legal Pot is Notoriously White. Oakland Is Changing
That., POLITICO (March 27, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/03/27/oak
land-legal-cannabis-hood-incubator-217657 [https://perma.cc/3FYX-DEQ2].
194
See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103
(2013).
195
See, e.g., Ahrens, supra note 23, at 738–39 (discussing the “othering process” that
motivates most modern criminal sanctioning regimes).
196
Certainly, all criminal convictions carry the possibility of social stigma, and
misdemeanor drug offenses perhaps particularly stigmatize because of stereotypes about
persons associated with substance use. That said, “misdemeanant” is not a proper noun
generally found in newspaper headlines or common vernacular.
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person identified as a convicted criminal in his or her community may always
find it difficult to fully participate.197
F.

THE SCOPE OF ELIGIBILITY

Pardoning low-level, one-time convictions is necessary but insufficient
to make amends for past harms. The legal marijuana industry is burgeoning,
lucrative, and overwhelmingly run by individuals who have not been touched
by criminal justice. 198 The communities that were harmed by marijuana law
enforcement during the War on Drugs continue to suffer economic and
educational setbacks because of past engagement with marijuana.199 They
generally are not experiencing gains based on present marijuana
commerce. 200 A person with a single marijuana possession conviction is
extremely sympathetic, making the argument for pardon or expungement
relatively easy—the person’s offense is minor, and it represents a (usually)
youthful one-off mistake. The people who are likely to be experiencing the
most significant lingering effects of past criminal law are those who have
multiple convictions and/or felony convictions. 201 A potential employer may
be willing to take a chance on an individual with a lone decades-old
marijuana conviction that is not expunged; a person with several convictions,
or a felony conviction, is less likely to experience such grace.
There is not necessarily a meaningful, salient difference between the
person who engaged in routine recreational marijuana use during the age of
prohibition without getting caught and the person who at some point came to
the attention of police and amassed more than one misdemeanor conviction,
particularly in light of documented racial differences in enforcement. 202
197
This demarcation is not without social value, particularly if the criminal conviction is
for an offense society continues to identify as dangerous. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 189, at
6 (arguing that employers use criminal background checks to avoid hiring employees that may
cause harm and carry liability). This argument makes sense where we continue to judge a
person’s past conduct to be the sort that would create danger; where we have determined the
behavior to be socially acceptable, that argument is unpersuasive.
198
See supra notes 111–117 and accompanying text (discussing burgeoning legal
marijuana industry).
199
See supra Part II.
200
See supra Part II.
201
It is difficult to pin down what percentage of persons with marijuana convictions have
been convicted of low-level possession versus either felony possession or felony sales,
trafficking, and cultivation offenses. The overwhelming majority of arrests are for possession
offenses, but, as such arrests may be more likely to result in dismissal, adjournment in
contemplation of dismissal, pretrial intervention, or other non-conviction dispositions than
higher-level offenses (and as about 25% of all charges end in dismissal), projecting from arrest
statistics likely would not be helpful.
202
See DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 64 and works cited therein.
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While there is an argument to be made that a person who continues to engage
in criminal infractions after the intervention of criminal law is more morally
culpable than a person who has not enjoyed the supposed benefits of such
interaction—rehabilitative efforts, for example, that are designed to address
issues that may cause criminal behavior—there are several reasons why that
narrative is not persuasive. First, given the widespread use of recreational
marijuana and the much narrower, unrepresentative group of individuals
convicted of marijuana offenses, 203 marijuana convictions likely reflect
decisions about where and how to police (as well as whether or not to effect
an arrest or citation when someone is discovered engaging in criminal
activity) rather than underlying rates of criminal behavior. Even individuals
who are ultimately cited or arrested by police may be more likely to be able
to participate in pretrial diversion programs if they have social or economic
status. 204 Second, once an individual has a criminal conviction, it may be
more likely that police surveil or arrest (and that prosecutors pursue charges)
because the prior conviction exists. 205 In other words, people are more likely
to be surveilled, detected, and arrested in some communities than others; they
are likely to remain in those communities; and, once they have an offense,
they may be less likely to enjoy leniency.
For these reasons, persons convicted of felony marijuana offenses
should also enjoy the benefit of having convictions expunged. Some
jurisdictions, such as California, are permitting certain felony convictions to
be reclassified (and resentenced, where applicable) as misdemeanor offenses,
which is preferable to leaving felony convictions untouched. 206 Felony
convictions are, however, undergirded by the same problematic discretionary
decisions as possession offenses. The decision whether to proceed against
an individual on felony or misdemeanor charges is discretionary, meaning
that similarly situated individuals ultimately plead to or are otherwise

203

See supra notes 64–65 and works cited therein.
See Shaila Dawan & Andrew W. Lehren, No Money, No Mercy: After a Crime, the
Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/1
2/us/crime-criminal-justice-reform-diversion.html [https://perma.cc/7YD2-GFJ8] (detailing
substantial cost of participating in pretrial diversion programs and disproportionate impact this
has on ability of individuals of different incomes to take advantage of such programs).
205
For a discussion of the various schemas, assumptions, and biases that shape police
decisions about whom to investigate, approach, and detain, see Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983–
87 (1999).
206
While California permits automatic expungement for misdemeanor offenses, felony
reclassification is generally treated as more of a discretionary act. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11361.9 (2018).
204
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convicted of different offenses, and that those plea decisions may be made
along lines other than relative culpability. 207
Marijuana convictions reflect racist governmental decision-making at a
variety of junctures, and expunging past convictions produced by racist
decision-making is an appropriate (if not fully adequate) act of restoration
for the communities that have been most affected. The laws that first
criminalized and then increased criminal penalties for marijuana activity
largely reflected racism, first against Mexican immigrants and then against
black communities. 208 Laws criminalizing marijuana likely would not have
existed in the first place absent racial animus. 209 That animus has been even
more striking, however, in enforcement of marijuana laws. While marijuana
use historically has tended to be fairly constant cross-racially, the majority of
persons convicted under laws criminalizing marijuana have been black or
Latinx. 210 Those convictions have had the effect of removing people from
their families and communities during incarceration, as well as subjecting
persons under probation or community supervision to surveillance and
supervision costs (affecting the families of supervised persons as well). 211
While part of the reason offered for expunging only misdemeanor
convictions is that the underlying conduct now is legal, that is true of felony
marijuana convictions as well. A person still cannot possess more than a
particular amount of marijuana for personal use, for example, but the
assumption undergirding higher penalties for greater quantities always was
that the higher quantities reflected a criminal intent to distribute the

207
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2468 (2004) (arguing that plea bargaining produces substantial inequalities along lines
of “wealth, sex, age, education, intelligence, and confidence”).
208
See supra Part I.A.
209
See supra Part I.A.
210
See supra note 64.
211
See generally Donald Brama, Families and Incarceration, in MARC MAUER & MEDA
CHESNEY-LIND, INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 118 (2002).
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product. 212 Now, a person in that position would, in theory, be able to open
a retail establishment and enjoy community respect. 213
Marijuana legalization has a great deal of public support, and this
support is driven in part by images of persons convicted of mere pot
possession. 214 The War on Drugs exacted a tremendous carceral toll, and
perhaps 20% of incarcerations over the past few decades can be attributed to
drug convictions, 215 meaning that a huge number of people are serving and
have served time directly for drug offenses. The reality, however, is that the
people who are eligible for expungements under the existing programs
proposed or adopted in most jurisdictions—people who have been convicted
only of low-level simple possession of marijuana offenses—do not comprise
a significant percentage of incarcerated persons. 216 In particular, it would be
unusual for a person convicted solely of a single low-level marijuana

212

Federal law and the law of most states allows for individuals to be charged with
“possession with intent to distribute” or some other similarly titled serious offense based
merely on the quantity of drugs in their possession. See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, Double Inchoate
Crimes, 26 HARV. J. LEG. 1, 23–24 (1989) (“[M]ost statutes penalizing possession of narcotics
with intent to distribute erect a legal presumption that the added mental element exists if the
defendant was holding a certain controlled substance or more than a specified quantity of the
controlled substance.”).
213
This Article has acknowledged that there are legal and monetary barriers to market
entry in the marijuana industry. See supra notes 119–122. This Article also does not suggest
that every marijuana outlet or pot shop is met with a warm community embrace. Marijuana
retail businesses are subject to zoning that reflects that such stores may not be appropriate in
all communities. Washington State’s marijuana zoning restrictions restricts, for example,
prohibit pot shops from locating within 1,000 feet of schools, playgrounds, parks, transit
centers, libraries, child care centers, or arcades that permit minors to enter. Some communities
have fought the location even of apparently properly-zoned businesses. See, e.g., Vaughn,
supra note 173 (members of a church located adjacent to Seattle’s second pot shop has staged
multiple protests against the location of the shop; ultimately, the church brought a lawsuit to
challenge the zoning).
214
See Koerth-Baker, supra note 172 (discussing degree to which reformers focused on
marijuana’s lack of harm and lack of rationale for criminalizing users).
215
John Pfaff, who has achieved a level of popular recognition for his statistical study of
incarceration rates, argues that any narrative that suggests that the War on Drugs has been a
primary source for mass incarceration (what he refers to as “The Standard Story”) or that
reining in that drug war will dramatically reduce mass incarceration lacks support in statistics.
According to his figures, only about 21% of state incarceration growth between 1980 and 2009
was caused by drug convictions. JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 32 (2017).
216
Cf. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-re
ports-and-sourcebooks/2017/Table33.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JCN-WBLF] (showing that in
2017, only ninety-two people were convicted in federal court for simple possession of
marijuana).
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possession charge to be sentenced to a term of incarceration at all.217 To the
extent that marijuana legalization is meant to address the past harms of mass
incarceration, the people carrying misdemeanor convictions are only a small
slice of people who are worthy of reconsideration—and not the most
important slice. Any effort to both reduce mass incarceration and make
amends for past harms inflicted by overuse of criminal law will need to
involve a much broader group of people than those convicted for minor drug
possession.
While a person released from confinement or correctional supervision
is in the same position as a never-supervised person with respect to the
conviction itself, they retain that additional experience of formal state
control; the incarcerative experience itself damages and severs family
relationships, employment and housing arrangements, financial well-being,
and community standing. 218 Their immediate families have also lost the
benefit of income, child care, and relationships. 219 Addressing and
reconciling those harms should be an essential element of meaningful
criminal justice reform.
Due to the economic effects of the War on Drugs on minority
communities, we should work to reduce the impact of past conviction
decisions on future economic opportunities. As this Article has noted,
marijuana convictions can bar individuals from reaping the benefits of the
legal marijuana industry, but more broadly, the War on Drugs was
particularly damaging to black communities who missed out on the economic
growth contemporaneous with the growth of mass incarceration, particularly
in the 1990s. 220 The economic harms are not limited to individual convicted
or incarcerated persons—employers avoid hiring persons from
neighborhoods perceived as high crime,221 and the communities themselves
217

In some jurisdictions that have legalized marijuana, low-level marijuana possession
already had been largely decriminalized by being transformed into a fine-only offense,
meaning that any convictions within the past decade or so would not have been eligible at all
for an incarcerative sentence. Even in jurisdictions where simple possession of marijuana
continued to carry a possible jail or prison term, a first-time low-level marijuana offense rarely
would lead to any sentence of incarceration. For a general discussion of the extent to which
the debate over mass incarceration has perhaps misleadingly suggested that nonviolent drug
offenses have driven mass incarceration, and the fact that solutions to mass incarceration will
require addressing other offenses, see PFAFF, supra note 215, at viii.
218
See Hoskins, supra note 178, at 626.
219
See Brama, supra note 211, at 118. Families also may incur direct costs associated with
incarceration, like travel costs to visit incarcerated family members and high-priced collect
phone calls. Id. at 120–21.
220
See Bruce Western et al., Black Economic Progress in the Era of Mass Imprisonment,
in MAUER & CHESNEY-LIND, supra note 211, at 175–78.
221
Id. at 177.
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have lost the economic and commercial contributions of their residents. To
redress the harms of criminalization and incarceration, states should take
action to help members of the communities that have borne the brunt of the
War on Drugs to be able to contribute economically and socially.
IV. THE MECHANICS OF RETROACTIVE LEGALITY
There are multiple mechanisms by which jurisdictions could curtail the
effects of past convictions. This section of the Article will describe pardons
and expungements, as well as the theoretical and practical advantages and
barriers to using these methods. The Article concludes that the most
promising route will be a combination of expungement and record-sealing
(likely accompanied by legislation that would prohibit the use of expunged
convictions for various purposes if unearthed). Any of these paths is
preferable to the current practice of indefinitely maintaining easily accessible
records of conviction. One of the primary determinants of the appropriate
path may be the political will of the state: pardons generally represent
executive discretion, while expungements may require (at least if statewide
and systematic) more legislative coordination and agreement. One concern
with both pardons and expungements is the extent to which even expunged
or pardoned convictions may be available to some parties, but clearing and
sealing past convictions will reduce the footprint of a conviction
considerably.
A. MASS PARDONS

Governor Inslee’s announcement has context: in the past, executives
have used the commutation and pardon power broadly to convert sentences
or relieve convictions. 222 Executives normally grant commutations and
pardons 223 to individual applicants who complete an involved and detailed

222
For general discussion about the history and scope of the pardon power, see Daniel T.
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wrestling the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 569 (1991) (arguing to move the process of granting clemency for retributive fairness
away from unguided executive discretion).
223
Commutations and pardons are distinct acts of executive clemency. Commutations
change the terms of a sentence but leave the underlying conviction in place; the commutation
might shorten a sentence, change a death sentence to a life sentence, or otherwise relieve a
convicted person of a sentencing condition. A pardon, in contrast, forgives the underlying
conviction itself, and generally is designed to restore a person to all rights of citizenship. See
Nora V. Demleitner, Implementing Change in Sentencing and Corrections: The Need for
Broad-Based Research, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 303, 303 (2016). A pardon may not, however,
fully restore all civil rights—since state law governs the right to vote, for example, a state
could still use a federally pardoned conviction to disenfranchise a potential voter. Id. at 304.
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process, 224 and those commutations and pardons are largely discretionary
even once a person completes the process. 225 Still, mass pardons of criminal
behavior have some historical precedent. Governors have been willing, for
example, to engage in some mass commutations in the death penalty
context. 226 There also is precedent for broadly clearing persons who were
convicted for particular categories of crime. The United States did not
decriminalize or legalize the practice of evading draft requirements, but on
his second day in office, President Jimmy Carter issued a full pardon
restoring all civil rights to persons convicted of nonviolent offenses under the
Military Selective Service Act. 227 As with death row commutations, the
underlying criminal behavior had not been legalized—it remained a criminal
offense to violate the Military Selective Service Act—but President Carter
argued that pardons were a necessary step to healing the social divides
created by the Vietnam War. 228 The act of pardon, in other words, was an
act of social restoration, both for the pardoned individuals and for the society
issuing the pardon.
Use of the pardon process carries several advantages over alternative
methods of expungement. First, executive pardon power is generally broad
224

The pardon process generally requires an applicant to compile records related to the
conviction as well as to provide documentation of reform efforts, and often benefits from the
guidance of an attorney.
225
See Kobil, supra note 222 (discussing and critiquing purely discretionary nature of
most executive clemency or pardoning schemes).
226
In 2003, then-Governor George Ryan famously commuted to life the death sentences
of all persons on death row in Illinois as one of his parting acts in office. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing
Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003,
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/12/us/citing-issue-of-fairness-governor-clears-out-death-r
ow-in-illinois.html [https://perma.cc/U8TG-LPA5]. Several other governors similarly have
commuted the death row in their states, all while exiting office. Ohio Governor Richard
Celeste commuted death sentences for the state’s eight death row residents in 1990. See At
End of Term, Ohio’s Governor Commutes Death Sentences for 8, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991,
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/12/us/at-end-of-term-ohio-s-governor-commutes-deathsentences-for-8.html [https://perma.cc/WC4H-AW6F]. New Mexico Governor Toney Arraya
commuted the death sentences of his state’s five death row occupants in 1986. See Robert
Reinhold, Outgoing Governor in New Mexico Bars the Execution of 5, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1986, https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/27/us/outgoing-governor-in-new-mexico-bars-the-e
xecution-of-5.html [https://perma.cc/8JQL-WG2S]. Arkansas Governor Winthrop
Rockefeller commuted his state’s fifteen-member death row in 1970. See Arkansas Spares All
on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/12/30/archives/ar
kansas-spares-all-on-death-row-outgoing-gov-rockefeller-commutes.html [https://perma.cc/F
3RZ-KWTA].
227
See Andrew Glass, President Carter Pardons Draft Dodgers, January 21, 1977,
POLITICO (Jan. 21, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/21/president-carter-pardon
s-draft-dodgers-jan-21-1977-346493 [https://perma.cc/9PPJ-RXFP].
228
Id.
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and discretionary. 229 Legislatures by necessity must deliberate over
individual bills, pass them through committee, debate them, clear procedural
rule hurdles, and, in the forty-nine states with bicameral legislatures,
reconcile them across legislative chambers—all before seeking executive
approval. Executives can move more swiftly than a legislature, and also may
be able to proceed where, for various reasons, a legislature is unable or
unwilling to pass legislation to clear past convictions. While many
jurisdictions do have a pardon infrastructure in place to advise executives on
whether or not to grant particular pardon applications, that infrastructure
itself is generally a creation of executive will. 230
However, there are several drawbacks to utilizing pardons related to the
fact that the use of the pardon power is in decline for reasons that will be
difficult to stem. 231 First, executives may be difficult to persuade to take
public, personal heat for the decision to broadly pardon persons convicted of
offenses, which is one of the reasons why executive use of the clemency
power has declined over time. 232 While local District Attorneys’ offices may
be more opaque and insulated from publicity, gubernatorial decisions enjoy
statewide and possibly national media coverage, and it is more difficult for a
governor to evade personal responsibility for pardon exercise (and some
political campaigns have had to contend with the after-effects of
229
See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
217 (1989).
230
See Kathleen Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or
Mercy?, 24 CRIM. JUST. 26, 27 (2009) (noting that while the Illinois and California governors
possess similarly broad pardon authority, the California governorship has chosen to constrain
itself with process).
231
See Margaret Colgate Love, Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the Theory and
Practice of Pardoning, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 125, 125 (2001) (noting a decline in the use of
presidential pardons and offering reasons that pardons have become disfavored).
232
One scholar who has studied the decline in use of pardon power notes that “[s]ome
governors think, ‘why should I do this? It won’t benefit me politically and it might hurt me.’
There’s some very crass political calculating going on.” Maggie Clark, Governors’ Pardons
Are Becoming a Rarity, PEW FOUND.: STATELINE (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.governing.com/
news/state/sl-governors-balance-politics-with-pardons.html [https://perma.cc/86SP-KU4H].
Fear of political backlash is likely why some governors have chosen to issue controversial
clemency grants as they have been on the way out of office. See supra note 226 and
accompanying text (discussing the decisions of several governors to commute the death rows
in their states during their lame duck governing periods). Some governors have, however,
recently been willing to exercise clemency discretion; Governor Jerry Brown, for example,
pardoned more than 1,000 people from 2011 to 2018, as compared to his immediate
predecessors Gray Davis, who granted no pardons at all, and Arnold Schwarzenegger, who
granted fifteen pardons. See Kate Mather, Gov. Jerry Brown Grants 132 Pre-Christmas
Pardons, Commutes 19 Sentences, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2017, https://www.latimes.com/polit
ics/la-pol-ca-jerry-brown-christmas-pardons-20171223-story.html [https://perma.cc/HLB6MGJ9].
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controversial clemency decisions). 233 Second, the relatively unchecked
discretion governors enjoy to offer clemency may delegitimize its offer;
while a pardon will have the same legal effect whether voters accept its
appropriateness or not, the unilateral offer of pardons without legislative
process may, in the long term, make people less likely to favor broad
conviction clearance and less likely to respect the issuance of any particular
pardon. Finally, pardons require persons with convictions to navigate an
infrastructure in order to enjoy the effects of a pardon, which would likely
reduce the reach of any systematic pardons. Potential applicants would have
to be aware that the pardon process was available; take the initiative to
navigate the process; and then successfully complete that navigation. 234
Records and paperwork that a person ordinarily might be expected to produce
in order to seek a pardon may no longer be available, 235 and there may be
financial costs associated with obtaining those records. Some people would
not have the awareness, fortitude, or finances to complete the process. The
pardon process can be streamlined—Governor Inslee’s pardon process, for
example, has an online form that people can access that is specifically
designed to permit individuals to apply for pardons without, for example,
employing a lawyer as a process guide. The process requires applicants to
fill out the online form (applicants do need to find their case numbers) rather
233

George H.W. Bush, under the media guidance of Lee Atwater, famously ran a political
advertisement focusing on then-governor Michael Dukakis’ decision to furlough Willie
Horton, and the common wisdom has been that the combination of “soft on crime” allegations
and racial focus helped cost Dukakis the 1988 Presidential election. See, e.g., Morgan
Whitaker, The Legacy of the Willie Horton Ad Lives on, 25 Years Later, MSNBC (Oct. 21,
2013), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-legacy-the-willie-horton-ad-lives [https://perma.
cc/RM83-ZTHZ]. The actual effects of the ad may have been overblown. John Sides, It’s Time
to Stop the Endless Hype of the ‘Willie Horton’ Ad, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2016, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/06/its-time-to-stop-the-endless-hype-o
f-the-willie-horton-ad/ [https://perma.cc/8XS2-FEK4] (arguing that few viewers saw the
Willie Horton ad and that by the time of the election, any effects had been largely neutralized).
Nevertheless, the Willie Horton ad has cast a long shadow over clemency decisions.
234
The pardon instructions for Vietnam War Era offenses comprise about a page and a
quarter of single-spaced text and require individuals who want to seek such a pardon to first
determine if the particular offense for conviction qualifies; to fill out a form “fully and
carefully” and submit it to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”); and to provide to DOJ the
charging document for the offense and the judgment of conviction or a court docket sheet
showing the date of sentence and sentence imposed. Vietnam War Era Pardon Instructions,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/vietnam-wa
r-era-pardon-instructions [https://perma.cc/F5KM-82UZ].
235
The Vietnam War Era Pardon Instructions offer a link to the national archives so that
a person who seeks a pardon can “research whether documents from your prosecution are still
available.” Id. While many persons who would want to seek a pardon for marijuana offenses
will have recent convictions, certainly many others will have convictions that are decades old,
and may have difficulty obtaining supporting documentation should any be required.
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than obtain copies of convictions personally. 236 Still, even a streamlined
pardon process requires initiative and some level of knowledge,
sophistication, and resources. 237
Ordinarily, administrative hurdles might not be prohibitive concerns,
because a person’s commitment to the pardon process can serve as an
appropriate proxy for their rehabilitation, which is a reasonable requirement
for applicants who have committed offenses that we still consider socially
dangerous. 238 We may believe people to be more worthy of pardon when
they are willing to demonstrate remorse and reformation by submitting
themselves to the process and putting in the associated work. But here, when
the purpose of the pardon is to reduce the collateral effects of convictions
reflecting behavior that no longer is criminal, the pardon process sorting
mechanism is more difficult to justify. Providing access to pardons clearly
is superior to no pardon at all, but since many of the people who are eligible
for pardons might be among the least able to navigate a pardon process,
having an expungement process that is prosecutor-initiated rather than
civilian-initiated most likely would be preferable.239
A final reason why pardons might not be the most appropriate
mechanism for eliminating the effects of past criminal convictions is more
theoretical than practical: a pardon may communicate that a person engaged
in socially harmful behavior, but has in the interim demonstrated herself to
be sufficiently worthy and reformed to merit relief from the criminal
conviction. Thus conceptualized, pardons are executive grants often based
on mercy. 240 Mercy is not the right fit for conceptualizing the erasure of past
convictions when the decision to punish the individual was unjust in the first
236
The forms for the process are available at https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/
files/2018-Clemency-and-Pardons-Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DK8-DPLQ].
237
The success of expungement reforms in Indiana, for example, is partially attributable
to the involvement of lawyers for applicants. See John Gaines & Margaret Love, Expungement
in Indiana, 30 FED. SENT’G REP. 252, 252 (2018).
238
When society wants to accord forgiveness for acts still considered socially harmful or
wants to recognize efforts at reformation from those who have committed such acts, placing
the onus on them and seeing how they respond might serve as an imperfect proxy for whether
they are worthy of forgiveness or have indeed reformed.
239
For example, the pardon process that Governor Inslee announced in January of 2019
was not necessarily initiated because Washington considered the pardon process to be superior
to the expungement process, but because of the failure of expungement statutes to make
headway in the legislature. See e.g., Jim Brunner, Inslee Pardons Pot Convictions of 13
Washington Residents. Now Lawmakers May Clear Criminal Records for 200,000 More,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 10, 2019, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/inslee-par
dons-13-marijuana-convictions-in-a-month-as-lawmakers-consider-expunging-hundreds-ofthousands-more/ [https://perma.cc/GHD8-K3M9].
240
See MOORE, supra note 229, at 5.
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place and when the point of removing the conviction is to offer limited
redress for a harm inflicted by the state. This message is also inappropriate
because it places the onus on the convicted individual to demonstrate
worthiness and reform, even though the state harmed the individual and
needs to make amends. Such focus may help explain why, for example, the
proposed pardon process in Washington is limited—an individual is eligible
to be relieved of the burden of a criminal conviction, but only if they had
never before committed a criminal offense and have not committed another
offense in the intervening years.241 Pardons are, of course, often issued not
because the person rehabilitated, but because the executive determines that
justice was miscarried, the person was innocent in the first place, or the
punishment was motivated by bias or other forces that should not be relevant
to criminal sentencing. 242 Nevertheless, the use of the pardon power can
suggest forgiveness and mercy on the part of the state.
The War on Drugs—and its use of marijuana as a battlefront—
affirmatively harmed (and continues to harm) individuals and communities.
Relief from the burden of conviction should be granted, not because the
individual has somehow personally earned it, but because the conviction
never should have existed in the first place, as we now understand.

241

See Johnson, supra note 2.
A recent high-profile pardon involved the Groveland Four. See, e.g., Katie Mettler,
‘Miscarriage of Justice’: Florida Finally Pardons Four Black Men Accused of Rape in 1949,
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/11/years-after
-miscarriage-justice-florida-pardons-four-black-men-accused-rape-by-white-woman/?utm_te
rm=.62f586ee1488 [https://perma.cc/Q3BL-KYWN] (Florida formally apologized and issued
posthumous pardons for four black men wrongly accused of raping a white woman; two had
been killed by a mob that included a local sheriff, while the others were convicted at trial). In
the federal criminal justice system, the Justice Department’s Standards for Consideration of
Clemency petitioners identifies innocence or miscarriage of justice as grounds for a pardon
application, but also counsels that an applicant will “bear a formidable burden of persuasion.”
See Standards for Consideration of Clemency Petitions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF THE
PARDON ATT’Y, https://www.justice.gov/pardon/about-office-0 [https://perma.cc/T696-NSX
B] (last accessed Mar. 11, 2020). Some state jurisdictions have specific standards for persons
claiming innocence rather than requesting mercy. Texas requires a person who petitions for a
pardon based on factual innocence to provide evidence of actual innocence from at least two
trial officials or findings of fact and conclusions of law from the district judge that demonstrate
actual innocence. See What is a Pardon for Innoncence?, TX. BD. OF PARDONS & PAROLES
(Jan. 2, 2019), http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/bpp/exec_clem/Pardon_for_Innocence.html [https:
//perma.cc/F4AX-XWLV] (distinguishing a pardon for innocence from other pardons).
242
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B. EXPUNGEMENTS (AND RECORD SEALING)

A second method to relieve the burden of a past conviction is through
expungement and record sealing. 243 Expungement is a traditional method for
removing past convictions from a person’s record (and may also be used to
eliminate arrest records). 244 Many jurisdictions have long permitted
expungements for old offenses by statute or constitutional provision under
particular circumstances, usually where the offense is minor and the
applicant has no other convictions. 245 Expungement access also has been an
aspect of criminal justice reform. 246 Judges generally grant expungements
upon the request of a convicted person, 247 although prosecutors also have a
role in the expungement process and can elect to seek an expungement
without a convicted person’s request. 248
California’s expungement process for marijuana convictions requires
the state’s Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to review existing state conviction
databases and identify convictions that can be expunged or reclassified (from
felony to misdemeanor). 249 This occurs through a semi-automatic process:
the state DOJ identifies eligible convictions and notifies prosecutors; public
defenders also receive notification and are to communicate with convicted
persons to the extent practicable; and prosecutors have an opportunity to
contest expungement if they consider a person to be too much of an ongoing
danger to receive expungement. 250 In the absence of any objection,
expungement proceeds automatically. 251
Expungements carry some advantages over pardons. First, the
expungement process can be initiated by a wider variety of actors. If a
243

Some jurisdictions also provide mechanisms to protect records from particular uses,
but in a manner more limited than expungement. See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 9121(b)(2) (West 2018).
244
For an excellent general discussion of the history and purpose of expungement, see
Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2839–41 (2017).
245
Id. at 2824.
246
Texas adopted a “second chances” law that allowed persons convicted of non-DWI
first-time offenses to expunge a broader variety of those offenses. Mike Ward, ‘Second
Chance’ Bill Gets Final OK in Texas Senate, HOUS. CHRON., May 22, 2017, https://www.chr
on.com/news/politics/texas/article/Second-chance-bill-gets-final-OK-in-Texas-Senate-11164
479.php [https://perma.cc/FL4G-SNED].
247
See Murray, supra note 244, at 2825; see also Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to
Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1150 n.56
(2015).
248
See Murray, supra note 244, at 2832.
249
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11361.9 (2018) (effective Jan. 1, 2019).
250
Id.
251
Id.
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particular state’s government is hostile to broad clearance of marijuana
convictions, local offices of prosecution can at least take the initiative to
begin the process for city offenses, as prosecutors did in San Francisco,
Seattle, and San Diego. 252 Second, the expungement process seems more
open to initiation by the government, without requiring the individual to
know that there is a process for removing a conviction and navigate that
process successfully. Third, voters can demand an expungement process
through ballot initiative. Ballot initiatives bypass the political concerns of
executives considering use of the pardon power, the similar reelection
concerns of individual state legislators, and the legislative rules and
processes that might make adopting even a popular piece of legislation
difficult. 253 Finally, expungements often are more automatic and nondiscretionary—a jurisdiction may permit all people with convictions a certain
number of years old to expunge those convictions, and the process often is
automatic if a person meets the requirements. As a practical matter, this
Article argues that a jurisdiction should follow whatever process most
expediently removes prior convictions in the political atmosphere in that
state, but as a theoretical matter, a state-initiated and automatic process seems
a better fit where the issue is not that we think a person has sufficiently
reformed, but that the behavior did not merit conviction in the first place.
Expungements do, however, have drawbacks. First, expungement
processes, like pardon processes, may rely on the initiative of individuals to
seek expungement, even if such expungements are authorized by state law
under specified criteria. 254 The person may be required to navigate a process
that could include filing a motion in court. Many people in jurisdictions
where such a process is available simply have not chosen to do so.255 Second,
252
See Matt Hoffman, San Diego City Attorney Moves to Dismiss 5,000-Plus Marijuana
Convictions, KPBS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/sep/25/city-attorneymoving-dismiss-more-5000-convictions/ [https://perma.cc/669A-3XLB]; Evan Sernoffsky,
SF District Attorney to Wipe Out 9,000-plus Pot Cases Going Back to 1975, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
25, 2019, https://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/SF-district-attorney-wipes-out-9-000-pl
us-13643128.php [https://perma.cc/7LSM-L3XP]; Press Release, City of Seattle to Nullify
All Misdemeanor Marijuana Convictions from Years Prior to Legalization (Feb. 8, 2018),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/press-release/2018/02/city-seattle-nullify-all-misdemeanor-marij
uana-possession-convictions-years [https://perma.cc/DZH7-QD84].
253
For similar recent uses of the initiative process to counteract the perverse political
incentives that often slow criminal justice reform, see supra Part III.A.
254
The expungement process in Oregon, for example, requires the convicted person to
take such initiative. See OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (2015).
255
According to the Drug Policy Alliance, while about half a million people were arrested
for marijuana offenses in California, during the period of time when individuals needed to
apply for expungements, only about 1,506 sent in applications. In Oregon, perhaps 78,000
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if the advantage of expungements is that they may rely on the initiative of
state actors to find and clear convictions, that process of finding and clearing
is not costless. Part of the reason that government-initiated clearance
programs may be limited is that they require the time and dedication of
government personnel (sometimes, the same personnel that generally
prosecutes people for offenses) to identify convictions and comply with
expungement processes. 256 If individuals seeking expungements shoulder
the entire burden, arguably only people who would meaningfully benefit
from expungements will explore the process (for example, a person with a
number of more serious, ineligible convictions will be less motivated to seek
expungement and less likely to benefit from such a grant), and the cost to the
state will be concomitantly less. Third, some jurisdictions have procedural
barriers to expungement in situations where a person has multiple
convictions from the same incident and not all of those convictions are
eligible for expungement; so, in such a jurisdiction, without other legal
changes, expungements of marijuana offenses for some individuals may be
impossible. 257 Finally, to any extent that an expungement is discretionary
(and this Article argues that expungements should be routine, automatic, and
non-discretionary), people who have lengthy criminal histories (even if those
histories involve only marijuana offenses) or complicated criminal histories
(that include non-marijuana offenses) may have difficulty getting relief. 258
A final point applying to both pardons and expungements: jurisdictions
will likely need to seal records of marijuana-related convictions and arrests
(which may be a part of the expungement process, or might require a separate
initiative— in which case, as the state initiates expungement, it should also
initiate record-sealing) to the extent that potential employers, landlords, and
other public interested parties might be able to access court records. 259
convictions are eligible for expungement, but only about 1,206 applied from 2015 to 2017.
See Quinton, supra note 133.
256
Some local nonprofits have attempted to ease this burden through projects that assist
people in navigating the expungement process. See, e.g., Volunteer Legal Services, Records
Project, KING CTY. BAR ASS’N, https://www.kcba.org/Portals/0/for-public/RecordsProjectFly
er.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWN8-JYSD].
257
Maryland, for example, has the “Unit Rule,” which requires that if a person wishes to
seek expungement of charges related to a particular transaction, all of those charges must be
eligible for expungement for expungement on any charge to be granted. See EXPUNGEMENT:
UNIT RULE, MD. ALLIANCE FOR JUST. REFORM, https://www.ma4jr.org/expungement-unitrule/ [https://perma.cc/B2EC-H9ZV].
258
Courts more commonly reject applications from persons with extensive criminal
histories. See Quinton, supra note 133.
259
See, e.g., Sharon M. Dietrich, Clean Slate Brings Automated and Expanded Criminal
Record Sealing to Pennsylvania, 90 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 39, 42 (2019) (explaining historical
difference between expungement and sealing processes).
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Jurisdictions also will likely further need to restrict employers, landlords, and
similarly-situated parties from asking about convictions and arrests. 260
V. RESPONDING TO POSSIBLE CONCERNS
There are a number of possible arguments against this Article’s proposal
that should be addressed. These arguments center primarily around the
importance of maintaining accurate public records of past criminal behavior,
and the belief that past criminal behavior is at least somewhat predictive of
future behavior even if it represents transgression against norms no longer
encoded in criminal law. This Article does not argue that expunging or
pardoning past convictions carries no possible downsides—the categories of
people who receive relief may be both over and under-inclusive, and there
may be some important social interests that are less well-served when people
no longer carry these convictions. There are also theoretical reasons why we
might wish to continue to mark persons who elected to violate the criminal
code even if we consider the behavior in which they engaged to no longer
be—if it ever was—problematic. In this section, this Article responds to the
most salient objections to across-the-board pardons, expungements, and
conviction sealing for marijuana-related offenses. While this Article
concludes that the benefits of clearing convictions exceed the costs, the costs
are worth recognizing and addressing.
One critique is that by sealing marijuana convictions, people who
actually committed non-marijuana offenses—perhaps violent offenses or
other offenses that appropriately garner broad social opprobrium—will
receive an undeserved windfall where premised on the assumption that a
marijuana offense (or a series of marijuana offenses) was their only crime for
which they were convicted. Criminal convictions do not necessarily reflect
all underlying criminal conduct. 261 Since the overwhelming majority of
convictions rest on guilty pleas rather than on verdicts reached at trial, 262 and
260

See supra note 190 and works cited therein (discussing “ban the box” statutes).
When Colorado first introduced legislation to expunge past convictions, some
prosecutors successfully opposed the legislation on exactly this basis. A spokesman for the
Colorado District Attorneys’ Council, for example, argued that “There were many cases of
distribution that were pleaded to low-level [possession] felonies.” Quinton, supra note 133.
For an explanation of how plea bargaining works (including dismissing charges), see generally
Bibas, supra note 207.
262
At least 90%—and in some jurisdictions, a much higher percentage—of cases that
result in convictions are resolved by plea bargaining. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, Stat. Tbl. 22, 25 (2013); see also
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 5 (2018), https://www.nacdl.org/
261
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since the plea bargaining process (whereby parties may negotiate the
dismissal of charges) prompts many of those pleas, it certainly will be the
case that an individual who has pleaded guilty to a marijuana offense may
have enjoyed the dismissal of non-marijuana offenses connected to the same
underlying facts. 263 For example, a person might have originally faced
charges of felony possession with intent to distribute marijuana and carrying
a weapon in connection with a drug offense, and a prosecutor might have
agreed to dismiss the weapons charge in exchange for a guilty plea to the
marijuana offense. Charges from entirely separate incidents also may have
been dismissed as part of a plea package.264 A person might have a marijuana
distribution offense that was reduced to a simple possession offense, which
would matter should a jurisdiction limit conviction clearance to minor
offenses.
The argument here is that a person who had committed a number of
offenses but pleaded guilty only to marijuana offenses would be unfairly
advantaged, and prosecutors would not have willingly entered those plea
bargains had they understood that, eventually, the person would no longer
have consequences even for the marijuana conviction itself. Prosecutors
might say that had they known that the marijuana convictions eventually
would be dismissed, they would have sought conviction for the other
offenses, because the person’s behavior in total merited some form of
criminal correction. The state perhaps has an interest, also, in marking an
individual as having committed some sort of criminal offense and in
signaling the degree and extent of a criminal history to future prosecutors,
police, and other community actors, and a person with only marijuana
offenses will no longer be easily and publicly designated as a person who has
committed criminal offenses. To the extent that they have criminal histories
that no longer reflect a conviction for a particular set of charges but do have
other non-expunged charges, their records will look light.
There are several reasons, however, why this argument ultimately is
unpersuasive. First, prosecutors often—perhaps, generally—dismiss the
charges that they are least likely to be able to prove at trial or are least
important to prove. 265 Prosecutors often overcharge in order to facilitate plea
bargaining, and may press charges where they have scant chance of
trialpenaltyreport/ [https://perma.cc/4SEU-VUSY] (concluding that less than 3% of federal
cases go to trial).
263
See generally Bibas, supra note 207.
264
See id.
265
Cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 29, 32 (2002) (discussing quality of evidence and what prosecutors can prove as essential
aspects of screening charges).
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sustaining a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden at trial in order to pressure
criminal defendants into pleading guilty to some narrower offense.266 The
gulf between the possible penalties available at trial—often 25% higher for
the same charges—and the sentences authorized by plea bargains further
promotes pleas. 267 The dismissal of related charges in exchange for a plea of
guilty, in other words, may not bear much relationship to actual culpability
for those charges; those charges may have been filed for strategic reasons,
and may have been dismissed for lack of evidence sufficient to meet the
state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether or
not plea bargaining occurred. 268 Second, drug offenses, unlike violent
offenses or property offenses, generally will not have specific victims who,
in many jurisdictions, now have statutory rights to be involved in plea
bargaining; if the related charges were particularly important and involved
actual victims, those charges likely would have been the focus for
conviction. 269 Further, while the publicly-accessed criminal record will no
longer reflect an expunged and sealed offense, prosecutors and courts
generally can still access expunged and pardoned convictions, which might
be taken into account in charging and sentencing should a person reoffend. 270 Finally, and most importantly, a person who was convicted of a
marijuana offense in the past has, by definition, already experienced the
criminal punishment process. The convicting court imposed some
266
See id. at 33. It is difficult to catalog how widespread overcharging is because plea
bargaining generally occurs outside of court, and prosecutors do not self-report overcharging.
See Bibas, supra note 207, at 2547.
267
See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge
of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2011) (arguing that overcharging may
persuade risk-averse innocent persons to plead guilty); Daniel Givelber, Punishing
Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1363, 1371 (2000) (describing how federal sentencing guidelines create higher sentences
for persons convicted at trial versus pleading guilty to same offenses).
268
See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 265.
269
Both federal and state law frequently provide crime victims with a statutory right to
“confer” with the prosecutor before the government drops charges, agrees to plea
arrangements, or recommends sentences. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2015) (providing
victims with “the reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case”);
AK. CONST. art. I, § 24 (granting victims “the right to confer with the prosecution”); ARIZ.
CONST. art. 2 § 2.1(A)(6) (granting victims the right to “confer with the prosecution, after the
crime against the victim has been charged, before trial or before any disposition of the case
and to be informed of the disposition”); OR. CONST. art. I § 42(1)(f) (granting victims the
“right to be consulted, upon request, regarding plea negotiations involving any violent
felony”).
270
This Article does not advocate that prosecutors reflect expunged convictions in
prosecution decisions but acknowledges that under most pardon and expungement systems
they retain some discretion to (silently) do so if they so choose.
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punishment—whether incarceration, probation, or fine—and that
punishment presumably reflected what was thought to be the person’s
collected retributive responsibility as well as the utilitarian need for
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. The criminal conviction itself
is not supposed to be the punishment, and the argument to maintain a public
record of conviction for legitimate criminal law purposes is thin.
A related argument some have offered for being cautious about
expunging marijuana convictions is that we believe that prosecutors and
sentencing courts ought to have access to those convictions when
determining appropriate charges for future criminal activity and reasonable
sentences for that activity. This argument is superficially a little more
persuasive, as past criminal activity has historically been a primary factor
that criminal justice has used in determining appropriate present
punishment. 271 While states that have legalized marijuana use have
determined that recreational marijuana is a legitimate business and
acceptable leisure pursuit, and while a person adhering to the current legal
regime thus chooses to conform his or her behavior to the dictates of law, a
person who in the past used, cultivated, or sold marijuana made an
affirmative decision to transgress criminal law. That decision to transgress
criminal law is itself morally blameworthy, regardless of whether or not
social attitudes have shifted to the point that marijuana now enjoys legal
status.
This argument is unpersuasive for a few reasons. First, prosecutors and
judges may in many jurisdictions use expunged convictions in charging and
sentencing; 272 while this Article is not advocating for such use, jurisdictions
can make past pardoned and expunged convictions available to criminal
justice actors to guide discretion. Second, this argument elides the extent to
which marijuana use and sales have been widespread for decades, but the
costs of criminal behavior have been borne by an unrepresentative few. As
this Article has demonstrated, persons convicted for marijuana offenses are
predominantly poor and from minority communities. 273 Further, those
persons convicted of marijuana offenses have actually experienced
punishment, unlike the overwhelming majority of people who have used or
sold marijuana who experienced no such consequences. In other words, if
past marijuana-related criminal activity is central to charging or sentencing
culpability, prosecutors and judges largely will not have access to
271
For a thorough discussion of the history and policy behind this practice, see Nancy J.
King, Barrock Lecture: Sentencing and Prior Convictions: The Past, the Future, and the End
of the Prior-Conviction Exception to Apprendi, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (2014).
272
See Western et al., supra note 220 and accompanying text.
273
See supra notes 190, 260–265 and accompanying text.
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documentation of the majority of such activity; the marginal value of being
able to use past convictions for people who largely have those convictions
because of poverty or race seems less weighty when we are dealing with
conduct that is now legalized.
With respect to that law-abiding citizenship, however, a third and
related argument against expunging marijuana convictions is that those
convicted persons elected to violate criminal law. This argument has both a
general and a marijuana-specific form. As a general matter, the decision to
knowingly transgress existing statutory rules arguably says something about
an individual’s character or future dangerousness. 274 According to this
argument, erasing the conviction undermines the rule of law. More
specifically, while states now permit a legal marijuana trade and personal
marijuana use is not criminally prosecuted under most circumstances, all
states still retain some criminal regulation of marijuana, forbidding, for
example, unlicensed cultivation or sales outside of the legally regulated
framework. 275 Some might argue that persons convicted under the old laws
are generally analogous to persons who smoke marijuana in prohibited
locations or sell marijuana illicitly at present rather than those who use, buy,
or sell it legally.
The difficulty with this argument tracks the difficulties with other
objections. A person with a prior conviction has, in fact, been punished by
whatever sentence he or she received at the time of conviction. Since the
punishment itself cannot be withdrawn, the only real question is whether or
not a person should continue to experience the collateral effects of prior
conviction even after completing punishment. While the person indeed
elected to engage in criminal activity, as this Article has noted, that decision
does little to set him or her apart from the many other people who engaged
in identical behavior but escaped detection or punishment, often in large part
because of structural advantages. 276 Further, at the time that the person
engaged in the behavior, unlike at present, there was not a legal option for
sales or possession; those formerly convicted are not in the same position as
a person who makes the decision not to adhere to a legal regime in favor of
an illicit one. Finally, part of the point of erasing past convictions is for us,
274
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collectively, to admit that we made an error in criminalizing, prosecuting,
and punishing in the first place—we used animus towards disfavored groups
and bad information to create laws that rationally should not have existed in
the first place and permitted most people to violate those laws without
consequence. We engaged in a War on Drugs that punished primarily the
least powerful members of communities, and the best we can do now is to
relieve the people we harmed from the burden of continuing to be marked as
criminals based on marijuana-related activity.
Further, continuing to expose persons convicted of criminal offenses to
the constraints of collateral consequences where the underlying activity has
been legalized and where people receive economic benefit from the activity’s
current iterations may itself undermine the rule of law. Overcriminalization
itself undermines public respect for criminal law. 277 As communities gain
awareness that members may carry convictions for behavior that no longer is
criminalized (and that many of us regret criminalizing in the first place), the
communicative force of the criminal law may be weakened—how can we
trust a social demarcation of criminal status where a person could engage in
the same behavior today and not just escape punishment, but build capital?
A number of opinion pieces and news articles in popular media sources, as
well as prominent public and political figures, have noted the dichotomy
between the poor, minority persons who continue to be imprisoned for or
constrained by marijuana convictions and the affluent, mostly white citizens
who are profiting from the cannabis industry. 278
CONCLUSION
The project of reducing the impact of past convictions on current and
future civil, employment, educational, and social opportunities is daunting
and difficult. We have institutionalized the notion that persons with criminal
convictions are “other” and lesser and have imposed formal and structural
barriers to their full civic engagement. In the long term, it may be worthwhile
to reconsider the extent to which criminal convictions, even for behavior that
we continue to consider socially dangerous, should mark and constrain
277
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persons once they have received their punishment. At the least, however, we
should commit to removing those burdens where criminal law no longer
regulates the underlying behavior, and the argument for removing
convictions is particularly strong where, as in states that have legalized
marijuana for recreational use, the government goes so far as to regulate, tax,
and promote the newly-approved behavior and industry.
Criminal convictions communicate social condemnation; 279 that mantle
is unfair to drape around persons whose past behaviors now are
acknowledged as ones that comport with current values. The very real legal
and social consequences for the individuals who bear the mark of conviction
should move us toward expunging or pardoning and sealing convictions
where the underlying behavior has been legalized. As we begin the process
of decriminalizing offenses and decarcerating individuals, deleting past
convictions is an important step, both to remove the constraints faced by
convicted persons, as well as to make amends for having subjected those
persons to criminal prosecution in the first place. This process should include
people who made isolated errors that do not reflect their character, but also
people who have multiple convictions and felony convictions. As we grapple
with the after-effects of over-incarceration and inappropriate criminalization
of a wide variety of social problems, the process of reconciliation must be
broad and apologetic. If we are serious about rethinking how we administer
criminal justice and about redressing individual and community harms,
retroactively legalizing marijuana is the place to start.
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